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I. INTRODUCTION
How do we respond to terrorism? In my view, we must distinguish among three
possible legal responses-direct action, criminal remedies, and civil remedies-or, if
you prefer, countering terrorism, making terrorists pay, and making terrorists pay up.1
The first category-direct action, or countering terrorism-encompasses a wide
variety of responses: Monitoring terrorist groups, detecting terrorist attacks before
they happen, coping with terrorist incidents while they occur, and formulating
appropriate responses in the immediate aftermath of terrorist strikes. Although this
type of response raises numerous troubling legal problems,2 the most difficult
questions posed are political and logistical. At the international level, how can the
United States coordinate a unified and effective multilateral political and economic
response against terrorism?3 At the national level, how can the United States
Government best mobilize its military, intelligence, and state and federal law
enforcement organizations to respond effectively to particular terrorist incidents?4
Criminal and civil responses differ in kind from direct antiterrorist action,
inasmuch as they seek not to combat terrorism directly, but rather, to remedy its effects
(and by so doing, to contribute to the counterterrorist effort). Criminal remedies
address the apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of terrorists. Although
frequently overlooked, a relatively comprehensive and complex international legal
1. When this essay was first prepared, I had not yet pondered a fourth possible response to terrorism:
Namely, paying terrorists off. But see N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1987, at 8, col. 3 (remarks of President Reagan)
(conceding that the recent United States policy of selling arms to Iran "sort of settled down to just trading
arms for hostages, and that's a little like paying ransom to a kidnapper").
2. Difficult questions of international legality arise, of course, when a state resorts unilaterally to force
in order to rescue its nationals, to apprehend terrorists, or to retaliate against states supporting terrorism.
Three recent United States' actions raise these questions: President Carter's unsuccessful effort in April
1980 to rescue American hostages in Tehran; the October 1985 interception of an Egyptian aircraft carrying
the Achille Lauro hijackers; and the April 1986 bombing raid against the headquarters of Libyan leader
Qaddafi. For analyses of these questions, see generally Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the
Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 138-41 (1986); Note, Toward a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille
Lauro Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 724 (1986); Note, Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The U.S.
Rescue Mission to Iran and its Legality Under International Law, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 485 (1981). Compare
Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 901,921-22 (1986) (justifying the United States' April
1986 bombing raid against Libya on grounds of self-defense) with Fried & Boyle, The Tokyo Summit
Declaration Does Not Support he U.S. Attacks on Libya, 35 INT'L PRAC. NOTEBOOK 9 (1986) (challenging
that justification).
Perhaps the most important question of domestic law raised by such unilateral responses is whether the
President must consult with Congress before taking counterterrorist action. Compare Leich, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 636 (1986) (testimony of Legal
Adviser Abraham Sofaer that the consultation and reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution
do not necessarily apply to antiterrorist acts such as the United States' 1986 military actions against Libya)
with Glennon, Mr. Sofaer's War Powers "Partnership," 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 584 (1986) (criticizing this
assertion).
3. Numerous commentators have addressed this question. See, e.g., TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST
CAN WIN (B. Netanyahu ed. 1986).
4. For a treatment of this question, see generally W. FARRELL, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
TO TERRORISM: IN SEARCH OF AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY (1982).
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framework already exists to grapple with these tasks. Four tiers comprise this
international legal framework: (1) global conventions such as the Tokyo,5 Hague,6 and
Montreal7 Conventions on aircraft hijacking and sabotage, and the recent conventions
condemning hostage-taking8 and crimes against internationally protected persons;9 (2)
regional pacts, such as the Europeano and Organization of American States"
Conventions on the Suppression of Terrorism; (3) bilateral treaties, particularly those
facilitating extradition;2 and (4) national laws, such as United States federal legislation
criminalizing attacks against aviation13 and internationally protected persons,14
hostage-taking,5 and theft of nuclear materials.16
5. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, opened for
signature Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
6. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1970,22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192,860 U.N.T.S. 106.
7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage),
opened for signature Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
8. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 23,
U.N. Doc. A/34/39 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
9. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature Dec. 14,1973,28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532,
1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Convention on Internationally Protected Persons]. For a description of these
five global conventions, and the problems of obtaining effective enforcement through them, see generally
Note, Legislative Responses to International Terrorism: International and National Efforts to Deter and
Punish Terrorists, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 326-44 (1986).
Although not expressly directed against terrorism, two other multilateral conventions also attempt to
criminalize the possession, diversion, or use of especially dangerous or poisonous materials: Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062 (applying controls on
toxic weapons that are of potential use to terrorists); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, Oct. 26, 1979, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1980, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1419 (1979) (requiring
assurances that nuclear materials traded and used for peaceful purposes will be protected during
international transport). The texts of the most significant multilateral terrorism conventions are reproduced
in TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: CONVENTIONS AND COMMENTARY (R. Lillich ed. 1982).
10. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1977, Eur. T.S. No. 90. The European Convention has been supplemented and stiffened by the Agreement
on the Application of the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 325
(1980) ("Dublin Agreement").
11. Organization of American States Convention on Terrorism, opened for signature Feb. 2, 1971, 27
U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413 [hereinafter OAS Convention].
12. For a description of the law of extradition specified by these bilateral treaties, see RESTATEMENT
(REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 475-478 (Proposed Final Draft
1986) [hereinafter REVISED RESTATEMENT]. In addition to the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal Conventions,
a number of bilateral agreements on aircraft hijacking also exist. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding
on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offenses, Feb. 15, 1973, Cuba-United States, 24 U.S.T. 737,
T.I.A.S. No. 7579.
13. See, e.g., Aircraft Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1472 (Supp. III 1984)
(extending United States antihijacking law to reach alleged violators of the Montreal Convention).
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 112, 878 (Supp. III 1979) (implementing Convention on Internationally Protected
Persons, supra note 9).
15. As part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress approved the Act for the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. II 1984). That Act
implements the international obligations assumed by the United States under the International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 8.
16. Although the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, supra note 9, has not yet
entered into force, the United States has already amended its criminal statutes to criminalize the acts
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Because this fairly well-articulated legal framework exists, the legal questions
regarding criminal remedies usually fall into one of three categories. First, how may
nations better utilize existing regional and bilateral extradition arrangements, employ
methods of rendition other than extradition (e.g., exclusion and deportation), and
invoke other forms of international judicial assistance in criminal matters (e.g.,
exchange of information, evidence, and prisoners)?'? Second, how may nations
supplement the existing framework through negotiation of new global treaties,
regional conventions and bilateral agreements,18 or enactment of additional national
criminal legislation against terrorism?19 Third, how may citizens ensure that their law
enforcement officials' understandable desire to punish terrorists will not lead them to
ride roughshod over the civil rights and civil liberties of the accused?
Of the available legal responses to terrorism, civil remedies are far and away the
least understood. In contrast to direct action and criminal remedies, civil remedies
seek neither to counter terrorism at an international or national level nor to punish
individual terrorists directly for their crimes. Broadly construed, the term "civil
remedies" encompasses all nonforcible, noncriminal means of sanctioning terrorists
and states who support terrorists. Unlike direct action, civil responses to terrorism
raise questions that are quintessentially legal, not political and logistical. At the same
time, civil remedies differ from criminal remedies in that no highly developed
international legal framework governing civil recovery against terrorists currently
proscribed by the agreement. See 18 U.S.C. § 831 (1982). For a compendium of other national laws
regarding terrorism, see LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM (Y. Alexander & A. Nanes eds. 1986).
17. For a recent work examining this question, see J. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY INITIATIVES (1985).
18. For a recent, controversial example of such an attempt, see Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June
25, 1985, United States-United Kingdom, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1104 (1985) (Senate advice and consent July
17, 1986). This agreement expressly amends the preexisting extradition treaty between the United States
and the United Kingdom to exclude from the list of nonextraditable "political offenses" serious offenses
typically committed by terrorists. These include aircraft hijacking and sabotage, crimes against diplomats,
hostagetaking, murder, manslaughter, malicious assault, kidnapping, and specified firearms, explosives, and
serious property damage offenses. See Gilbert, Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception Reappraised,
34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 695 (1985) (rehearsing arguments for and against applying the political offense
exception to terrorism). See generally Note, Eliminating the Political Offense Exception for Violent Crimes:
The Proposed United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 755
(1986) (describing treaty's key provisions).
19. Before 1984, the United States had passed only one statute pertaining specifically to antiterrorist
activities. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1801(c) (Supp. V 1981)
(authorizing electronic surveillance procedures for the gathering of intelligence information regarding
terrorists). In late 1984, Congress enacted three antiterrorism bills proposed by the Reagan Administration:
The Aircraft Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1472 (Supp. III 1984) (extending United
States antihijacking law to reach alleged offenders of the Montreal Convention); the Act for the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. III 1984) (implementing the
international obligations assumed by the United States under the International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages, supra note 8); and the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, 18 U.S.C. § 3071
(1984) (authorizing the Attorney General to reward individuals who furnish information regarding certain
terrorist acts). Two of these bills are described in Leich, Four Bills Proposed by President Reagan to Counter
Terrorism, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 915 (1984).
Title V of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, 99
Stat. 190 (1985), imposes additional prohibitions on assistance to and imports from countries supporting
international terrorism, particularly Libya. For the most recent U.S. legislation designed to counter
terrorism, see the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat.
853 (1986), discussed in infra note 77.
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exists.20 Moreover, unlike criminal remedies, which look solely toward punishment
and deterrence, civil remedies additionally contemplate making terrorists "pay up"-
that is, directly or indirectly compensating the victims of terrorist crimes by affording
victims or their governments an economic recovery from terrorists or their state
supporters.
This essay outlines and explores the questions raised under United States law
when individuals and governments invoke civil remedies to make terrorists pay up.
Parts II and III argue that the questions of whether and to what extent terrorists hould
pay for their uncivil wrongs through civil remedies have inspired two ongoing debates.
The first concerns questions of availability and obstacles. Participants in this first
debate21 ask: What civil remedies are currently available against terrorists and nations
supporting terrorism, and how can parties injured by terrorists overcome the
numerous legal obstacles that currently restrict the availability of those civil remedies
and reduce their practical chances of recovery? As Part II elaborates, two famous
circuit court cases mark the polar positions in this debate: The Second Circuit's 1981
decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala22 and the District of Columbia Circuit's 1984 ruling
in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic?3
Although the debate over availability and obstacles has achieved a high public
profile, it is not the only debate relevant to the subject of civil remedies against
terrorism. Part III of this essay argues that those who focus with tunnel vision on the
availability of particular civil remedies and the elimination of particular obstacles to
recovery risk losing sight of a second, more fundamental debate concerning civil
remedies that looms behind the first, namely, the debate over objectives and
institutions. This debate also revolves around two questions: What objectives do the
recognition and enforcement of civil remedies against terrorism serve and what
institutions within the national government are best situated to create and enforce
these remedies-the courts, Congress, or the Executive Branch?
Parts II and III jointly explain why those concerned about making terrorists "pay
up" should refocus their energies from the first debate to the second. As the District
of Columbia Circuit's decision in Tel-Oren reveals, the questions of whether and to
what extent terrorists should pay up through civil remedies implicate competing
national policy objectives. In my view, Congress is the national institution
constitutionally and functionally best-suited to balance these competing objectives.
For that reason, I believe that the ideal solution to the civil remedy problem would be
for Congress to resolve these important policy questions by enacting comprehensive
legislation creating civil remedies against terrorism.
Given that the optimal, legislative solution may not be soon forthcoming,
however, the question remains whether the federal courts can, without further
20. For example, the family of Leon Klinghoffer, the hostage killed aboard the Achille Lauro, can cite
no treaty or international convention explicitly affording a civil recovery against the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) in an international judicial forum.
21. Litigators in the field commonly address their attention to this debate. See, e.g., Bazyler, Litigating
the International Law of Human Rights: A "How To" Approach, 7 WHITIER L. REv. 713 (1985)
(enumerating litigation problems commonly encountered in human rights cases).
22. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
23. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). See infra notes 35-44 and
accompanying text.
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legislative guidance, provide a "second-best" solution to the second debate. Part IV
argues that individual and state litigants have recently asked the courts to do precisely
that in a growing number of domestic lawsuits, which comprise a burgeoning
phenomenon that I call transnational public law litigation. Part IV suggests that the
competing policy concerns raised by civil suits against terrorists, such as Tel-Oren, are
not sui generis, but rather, are implicated by this entire class of litigation. Reviewed in
this light, Tel-Oren ultimately proves less important for its refusal to make terrorists
pay up than for its failure to articulate and enunciate new legal norms regarding
international terrorism. In Tel-Oren, the court refused to promote the use of
transnational public law litigation to combat terrorism, thereby throwing back to
Congress the task of developing civil antiterrorist remedies. Part IV concludes that,
after Tel-Oren, Congress should respond to the missed opportunity by enacting
legislation that promotes the nascent transnational public law litigation genre.
II. THE FIRST DEBATE: AVAILABILITY AND
OBSTACLES
A. What Civil Remedies are Available Against Terrorism?
When Americans think about civil remedies, they tend reflexively to think first
of remedies provided by the courts, usually the federal courts. Yet the federal civil
judicial remedies currently available against terrorists remain relatively few in
number.24 If one looks beyond the courts and thinks imaginatively, however, the
24. The most prominent remedy available to alien plaintiffs against individual terrorists acting under
color of state law is found in the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982), discussed in greater detail in
infra notes 34-58 and accompanying text. Deportation and exclusion are also applied as civil sanctions
against alleged individual terrorists in so-called "disguised extradition" proceedings (i.e., efforts to deport
terrorists after the failure of criminal extradition proceedings). See, e.g., McMullen v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 658 F.2d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1981) (I.N.S. attempt to deport member of
Provisional Irish Republican Army to Ireland after failing to extradite him to the United Kingdom).
The principal civil judicial remedies available to the United States Government against groups
supporting terrorists are found in the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1984)
[hereinafter FARA] and the civil remedies provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984) [hereinafter Civil RICO]. FARA establishes a
comprehensive scheme of registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements for "agents" of "foreign
principals." Under FARA, the Attorney General has compelled the Northern Irish Aid Committee to
register as a foreign agent, to disclose its purposes, to make revelations regarding its political propaganda
activities and to account for its expenditures. See Attorney General v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 465 F.2d 1405
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1080 (1972).
Civil RICO authorizes government suits and private treble damage actions by persons injured in their
business or property against RICO "enterprises" engaging in a "pattern of racketeering." See 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c) (1982). RICO defines "pattern of racketeering" to include the commission of a series of predicate
acts, including "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping ... arson, . . . or extortion," within a ten-
year period. Id. §§ 1961(1), (5). For RICO purposes, an "enterprise" is further defined to include "any ...
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. § 1961(4). The United States has
brought criminal RICO actions against Serbo-Croatian terrorists extorting contributions from United States
residents. See U.S. v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). Recently, the United States Attorney's Office for
the Southern District of New York has considered invoking Civil RICO to seek injunctions limiting the
activities and obtaining forfeiture of the assets of other organizations supporting terrorist groups. See
Summary of Panel on Civil Remedies Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Terrorists, American Bar
Association National Conference on the Law in Relationship to Terrorism (June 6, 1986) (remarks of Carl
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nonforcible, noncriminal remedies available to combat terrorism span a far broader
range than one might first assume.
The array of possible "civil" antiterrorist responses run the gamut from those
remedies directed primarily against terrorist individuals and groups to those intended
primarily to sanction their state supporters. Immigration measures and curtailment of
travel rights are prime examples of nonforcible, noncriminal actions targeted against
individual terrorists.25 A listing of the available nonforcible, noncriminal sanctions
against state supporters of terrorism, by contrast, encompasses nearly every tool of
economic warfare currently available to nations:26 denial of import benefits,27 export
T. Solberg, Chief of Civil Division, Office of United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York)
(copy on file with Texas International Law Journal). At least one criminal RICO prosecution has been
brought against a foreign "enterprise" based on its overseas activities. See United States v. Parness, 503
F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). Under these RICO precedents, private
citizens could conceivably seek treble damages, costs, and attorney fees from groups supporting foreign
terrorists, claiming injury from the overseas activities of those groups.
25. The seven major democracies and the European Community agreed to take such actions at the May
1986 Tokyo Summit. See Tokyo Economic Summit, Statement on International Terrorism, May 5, 1986, 1
4, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1005 (1986). Shortly after the summit, Great Britain expelled three Syrian diplomats
because of their refusal to answer questions about their reported role in a plot to blow up an Israeli airplane.
See N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1986, at A26, col. 1. The United States also recently took deportation measures
against suspected terrorists. See supra note 24. For an example of legislation recently proposed to authorize
the exclusion of aliens affiliated with terrorist organizations from the United States, see H.R. 3903, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
26. For a survey of these sanctions, see J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 911-52 (2d ed. 1986). For a criticism of their effectiveness, see generally G. HUFBAUER & J.
SCHOTr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1985).
27. Section 502(b)(7) of the Trade Act of 1974, which authorized the creation of the United States
Generalized System of Preferences, bars any country that "aid[s] or abets, by granting sanctuary from
prosecution to, any individual or group which has committed an act of international terrorism" from
eligibility for duty-free treatment. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7) (1982 & Supp. III 1986). Although the Statute
permits the President to waive application of this provision, he may do so only after determining that
granting such a country developing country status "will be in the national economic interest of the United
States" and reporting that determination to Congress. Id.
Subject to consultation and reporting requirements, the International Security and Development Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-43, § 505, 99 Stat. 190 (1985), authorized the President to ban the importation into the
United States of any good or service from any country that supports or harbors terrorists. See 22 U.S.C. §
2349aa-9 (1986). Moreover, following the murder of American Leon Klinghoffer aboard the Achille Lauro,
Senator Bentsen introduced S. 1778, a bill designed to deny trade preferences, including most-favored nation
privileges, to any country listed by the Secretary of State as supporting terrorism. See Sen. Bentsen
Introduces Bill To Deny MFN Benefits to Terrorist Countries, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1340 (Oct. 23,
1985).
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controls, 28 financial embargoes and economic boycotts,29 withholding of foreign aid,30
termination of arms sales, 31 and suspension of air flights by both official and
nongovernmental institutions,32 to name but a few.
28. The Fenwick Amendment to the Export Administration Act of 1979 [hereinafter EAA] required
the Secretaries of Commerce and State to notify key congressional committees at least 30 days before
licensing the export of goods or technology valued at more than $7 million to any country that the Secretary
of State determined "has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism," if "such exports
would make a significant contribution to the military potential of such country ... or would enhance the
ability of such country to support acts of international terrorism." Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 6(i), 93 Stat. 513
(1979). See generally Note, Export Controls and the U.S. Effort to Combat International Terrorism, 13 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L BUS. 521 (1981).
The 1985 amendments to the EAA strengthened this provision so that once made, such a determination
may not be rescinded unless the President first certifies to Congress that the target country has not provided
support for major terrorists during the preceding six months and that the country has provided assurances
that it would not support acts of international terrorism in the future. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j)(2) (Supp.
1987). Section 509 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399
§ 509, 100 Stat. 853 (1986) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405()(1)), further amends that provision to
require presidential notification for any sale of goods or technology valued at more than $1 million. The
1986 amendment further prohibits export of any item on the United States Munitions List to any country
that the Secretary of State determines engages in or provides support for international terrorism. The same
amendment permits the President to waive this prohibition for ninety days, however, if he determines that
the proposed export is important to national interests and submits a report to Congress justifying the
determination and describing the proposed export. Id. Arguably, the Reagan Administration violated all
of these provisions by its recent conduct during the Iran-Contra affair. See supra note 1.
29. Recent examples include the economic sanctions imposed by President Reagan against Libya in
January 1986 and against Syria in November of the same year. See generally Documents Showing the
Evolution of Sanctions Against Libya, 25 I.L.M. 173 (1986); Administration Announces Economic Moves
Against Syria, Citing Terrorism Support, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1382 (Nov. 19, 1986). Sanctions were
imposed in both of these cases following presidential declarations of national emergency and executive
orders issued pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706
(1982).
The Terrorist Subsidy Prevention Act, another bill in the 99th Congress proposing financial embargoes
against terrorists, would have amended the EAA to allow the President o control capital transfers from
United States banks to countries defined as supporting international terrorism. The list of such countries
currently includes Syria, Libya, Southern Yemen, Iran, and Cuba. See Measure to Control Capital to
Terrorist List Nations, Garn, Moynihan Bills to be Combined, 3 INT'LTRADE REP. (BNA) 893 (July 9,1986).
Three other measures introduced in the 99th Congress would have taken a different tack, applying
government financial boycotts to private parties who do business with terrorists. See Pentagon Backs Bill
Denying Contracts To Firms With Ties To Terrorist Nations, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 618 (May 7,1986).
30. See, e.g., § 503 of the International Security and Development Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1977)
(prohibiting foreign assistance to countries supporting or granting sanctuary to terrorists under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, the Peace Corps
Act, or the Arms Export Control Act); the 1976 Terrorism Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2371(a)(1976) (requiring the President to terminate all assistance under the Foreign
Assistance Act to any government that aids or abets, by granting sanctuary from prosecution to, any
individual or group which has committed an act of international terrorism), discussed in Lillich &
Carbonneau, The 1976 Terrorism Amendment o the Foreign Assistance Act of 1976, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
223 (1977); see also Bretton Woods Agreements Act-Financing Facility, (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286e-1
1(1982)) (barring International Monetary Fund from assisting any country harboring international
terrorists); Omnibus Multilateral Development Institutions Act of 1977, 22 U.S.C. § 262d (1977)) (requiring
United States Executive Directors of the World Bank group and the International Monetary Fund to oppose
assistance or loans to any state providing refuge to individuals committing acts of international terrorism by
hijacking aircraft, unless national security necessitates otherwise); 1978 Amendment to the Export-Import
Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 95-481, § 607, 92 Stat. 1601 (1978) (barring foreign governments that aid, abet, or
grant sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or group which commits an act of international terrorism
from receiving funds appropriated by the Export-Import Bank).
31. The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act provides: "Unless the
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The existence of this unusually broad range of remedies counsels against
imposing a "New Yorker magazine view of the world" upon the topography of
"available" civil remedies.33 We must beware of myopically depicting the landscape
of civil remedies as dominated by courts and damage awards, with nonjudicial
remedies sketched only dimly in the distance. A broader construction of the term
"civil remedies" would recognize the availability to the Executive Branch and private
organizations of a wide range of noncriminal, nonforcible remedies against terrorists
and their state supporters, with judicial remedies representing only the tip of the
iceberg.
All of this having been said, public attention nevertheless returns almost
invariably to the judicial remedy as the civil remedy best adapted not only to making
terrorists "pay" in some general sense, but also to making them literally "pay up," in
the specific sense of compensating the victims of their acts. Whether compensation is
in fact likely or possible, however, depends upon the extent of the legal obstacles to
civil recovery, the other issue dominating this first debate.
B. Tel-Oren's Legacy: Obstacles to Civil Recovery
Under existing United States law, the obstacles to civil relief comprise a veritable
minefield of difficulties for parties seeking recovery from terrorists and their state
supporters. This situation results primarily from the District of Columbia Circuit's
1984 ruling in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,3 which splashed cold water on
efforts by victims of terrorism to obtain a civil recovery against heir assailants in
federal court.
President finds that the national security requires otherwise, he shall terminate all sales under this chapter
to any government which aids or abets, by granting sanctuary from prosecution to, any individual or group
which has committed an act of international terrorism." 22 U.S.C. § 2753(f)(1) (Supp. 1986). The recent
Reagan Administration arms sales to Iran may also have violated this provision. See supra note 1.
32. At the 1978 Bonn Economic Summit Conference, the seven major industrialized nations signed a
nonbinding agreement to suspend air service to and from countries that refuse to extradite or prosecute
hijackers or to return hijacked aircraft or passengers. See Bonn Economic Summit Declaration, Joint
Statement on International Terrorism, July 17, 1978, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1308-09 (July 24,
1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1285 (1978). Eight years later, the heads of the same seven nations and
representatives of the European Community agreed in Tokyo to "make the 1978 Bonn Declaration more
effective in dealing with all forms of terrorism affecting civil aviation". See Tokyo Economic Summit,
Statement on International Terrorism, May 5, 1986, 1 5, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1005 (1986); id. ¶ 2 (urging
nations to collaborate in international fora such as the International Civil Aeronautics Organization and the
International Maritime Organization to take countermeasures against terrorism).
In accordance with these multilateral declarations, President Reagan and Secretary of Transportation
Dole recently responded to the hijacking of a Trans World Airliner in Athens by invoking various provisions
of the Federal Aviation Act. Those orders barred Lebanese air carriers from flying to and from the United
States and prevented United States and foreign air carriers from carrying passengers to and from Lebanon.
See Sofaer, Fighting Terrorism Through Law, 85 DEP'T STATE BULL. 38, 40-41 (1985). Shortly after the
same incident, a private, nongovernmental organization, the International Airline Pilots Association,
proposed a worldwide pilots boycott against governments found responsible for terrorist acts against
airplanes. See N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1986, at A8, col. 4.
33. I refer, of course, to the famous New Yorker magazine cover that shows Fifth Avenue in the
immediate foreground, with New Jersey, Los Angeles, and Japan visible in the distance and Chicago and
Hawaii reduced to tiny bumps on the horizon. See THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 29,1976.
34. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1000 (1985).
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By now, the facts of Tel-Oren are familiar.35 Tel-Oren arose out of a March 1978
terrorist attack by thirteen members of a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
faction on more than 100 Israeli civilians traveling on an Israeli highway. During that
attack, the terrorists seized, tortured and shot hostages, eventually killing thirty-four
and seriously wounding nearly eighty others. Several years later, Israeli plaintiffs who
were either personally injured in the attack or who survived those killed in the attack,
sued the PLO, the Libyan Arab Republic, and three Arab-American groups in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs asserted
subject matter jurisdiction based, inter alia, on the Alien Tort Statute.36 That Statute,
first enacted in 1789, grants the federal district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."37
Tracking the Statute's language, the Tel-Oren plaintiffs alleged that they were
aliens victimized by torts authored by the PLO and supported by Libya and the three
private groups; these torts, they claimed, amounted to torture and terrorism in
violation of United States treaties and the "law of nations."38 At first blush, the Second
Circuit's 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,39 seemed to compel acceptance of
their claim. In that famous case, the Second Circuit held that the Alien Tort Statute
conferred subject matter jurisdiction over a tort suit brought by aliens against aliens
for official torture occurring overseas.40 Nevertheless, the district court dismissed the
35. Tel-Oren has already attracted reams of commentary. See, e.g., Agora: What Does Tel-Oren Tell
Lawyers?, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985); Recent Development, Separation of Powers and Adjudication of
Human Rights Claims Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 60 WASH. L. REV. 697 (1985); Comment, Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic: Redefining the Alien Tort Claims Act, 70 MINN. L. REV. 211 (1985); Note,
Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal Courts: The Alien Tort Statute and the Separation of
Powers, 74 GEO. L.J. 163 (1985); Note, Limiting the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort
Statute, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 941 (1984).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). Plaintiffs also claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the general federal
question provision, id. § 1331 (1982); the federal diversity provision, id. § 1332 (1982); and the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, id. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1982). See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
517 F. Supp. 542, 545 (D.D.C. 1981).
37. Congress originally enacted the Statute as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). The Statute's obscure provenance led Judge Friendly to dub it a "legal
Lohengrin; ... no one seems to know from whence it came." IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d
Cir. 1975). But see Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries Into the Alien
Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 11-31 (1985) (arguing that drafters intended the Statute to
extend federal authority over certain tort actions brought by aliens in which federal jurisdiction might
otherwise have been unavailable).
38. The plaintiffs construed this term to mean universally recognized norms of customary international
law not codified in treaties or international conventions, as they existed at the time of the lawsuit. On appeal,
only Judge Edwards endorsed this meaning of the "law of nations." See 726 F.2d at 777 (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
39. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
40. In Filartiga, two Paraguayan citizens invoked the Alien Tort Statute to sue a Paraguayan police
official who had tortured their relative to death in Paraguay. 630 F.2d at 878. The district court originally
dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but on appeal the Second Circuit reversed. Judge
Kaufman, writing for the court, construed the words "violation of the law of nations" in the Statute to
embody evolving notions of customary international law. Id. at 881. Under this interpretation, all
individuals, regardless of their nationality, possess a fundamental human right to be free from "deliberate
torture perpetrated under color of official authority." Id. On remand, the district judge then awarded the
two Paraguayan citizens a default judgment against the Paraguayan police chief of nearly $10.4 million in
compensatory and punitive damages. See 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). For further description and
discussion of Filartiga, see Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims:
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Tel-Oren action against all defendants for want of subject matter jurisdiction,41 the
D.C. Circuit unanimously affirmed in a per curiam opinion,42 and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari.43
The voluminous concurring opinions in Tel-Oren, authored by Circuit Judges
Edwards, Bork, and Robb, presented mutually conflicting rationales for affirming the
district court's judgment." Although two of those opinions expressly declined to
undercut Filartiga,45 their import clearly was to the contrary. Taken together, the
three Tel-Oren opinions present an array of legal doctrines that dramatically restrict
the practical availability of federal civil judicial remedies to victims of terrorism.
After Tel-Oren, ten distinct obstacles confront victims seeking a tort recovery
from terrorists and their state supporters in federal courts. First and foremost,
substantial barriers exist to subject matter6 and personal jurisdiction.47 A second
The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981); Sohn, Torture as a
Violation of the Law of Nations, 11 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 307 (1981).
41. Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981). The district court reasoned that § 1350 "serves merely
as an entrance into the federal court and in no way provides a cause of action to any plaintiff." Id at 549.
The judge further concluded that none of the treaties cited by the plaintiffs nor the law of nations conferred
a private right of action on individuals to enforce those international obtigations in domestic courts. Id. at
545-50. On appeal Judge Bork essentially endorsed the district court's view. See 726 F.2d at 799 (Bork, J.,
concurring) ("I believe, as did the district court, that in the circumstances presented here appellants have
failed to state a cause of action sufficient to support jurisdiction False . . . .").
42. 726 F.2d at 775 (per curiam). Before issuing the ruling, the D.C. Circuit held the case under
submission for nearly two years. See id. at 774.
43. 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). In response to the Court's invitation, 469 U.S. 811 (1984), the Solicitor
General filed an amicus brief urging that review be denied. That brief argued against review, largely because
of the lower court judgment's lack of clarity and the absence of a circuit conflict. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 427 (1985) [hereinafter
Government Tel-Oren brief].
44. See 726 F.2d at 775-98 (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 798-823 (Bork, J., concurring); id. at 823-27
(Robb, J., concurring). The extent of the judges' disagreement was so vast hat Judge Bork concluded that
"it is impossible to say even what the law of this circuit is" with respect to the meaning and application of
the Alien Tort Statute. 726 F.2d at 823 (Bork, J., concurring).
45. Judge Edwards claimed to "adhere to the legal principles established in Filartiga but [found] that
factual distinctions preclude reliance on that case to find subject matter jurisdiction in the matter now before
us." Id. at 776. Judge Bork, by contrast, distinguished Filartiga from Tel-Oren on three grounds: The
Filartiga defendant "was clearly the subject of international-law duties, the challenged actions were not
attributed to a participant in American foreign relations, and the relevant international law principle was
one whose definition was neither disputed nor politically sensitive." Id. at 820. For these reasons, Judge
Bork concluded that "not all of the analysis applied here would apply to deny a cause of action to the
plaintiffs in Filartiga." Id.
46. A court relying on the district court's opinion in Tel-Oren, as generally approved by Judge Bork on
appeal, supra note 41, would dismiss claims under the Alien Tort Statute unless plaintiffs could demonstrate
that either the law of nations or a treaty of the United States explicitly conferred a private right of action.
See infra note 50. Furthermore, the court would likely dismiss any federal question claims on the ground
that neither federal common law, federal criminal statutes against terrorism, nor treaties of the United States
expressly created a civil cause of action on behalf of plaintiffs and that the case therefore did not "arise
under" the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
Finally, alien plaintiffs invoking diversity jurisdiction would face constitutional problems, because Article
III of the Constitution does not recognize federal jurisdiction over suits brought by aliens against other
aliens on nonfederal causes of action. Cf Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983)
(sustaining constitutionality of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act against a challenge based on this
ground).
47. Serious problems of personal jurisdiction arise when defendants are terrorists or groups supporting
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question, seemingly mundane but critical in practice, is how does one serve a terrorist
with the process required to perfect personal jurisdiction?a Third, even assuming that
a United States court is willing to assert jurisdiction, how may an alien plaintiff defeat
a foreign defendant's inevitable motion to dismiss a suit alleging terrorist acts
committed on foreign soil, based on the revitalized doctrine of forum non
conveniens?49 Fourth, may victims of terrorist acts state a claim sufficient to survive
defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and if
so, under what body of law would that cause of action arise?50 Fifth, who, if anyone,
would have standing to sue terrorists in a federal court?5 ' Sixth, in a case alleging state-
terrorism who are neither present within the United States nor possess minimum contacts with it sufficient
to satisfy the due process standard stated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See,
e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 55 U.S.L.W. 4197, 4200 (Feb. 24, 1987) ("The unique burdens
placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in
assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders."). In
Filartiga, the defendant Pena was arrested in New York for violating his visitor's visa and ordered deported.
The plaintiffs were fortunate enough to serve the defendant with a summons and a civil complaint while he
was in a New York detention center awaiting deportation. The district court then stayed the deportation
order to ensure Pena's availability for trial. 630 F.2d at 879. The Second Circuit, id. at 880, and the Supreme
Court then denied further stays, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 442 U.S. 901 (1979), after which the defendant was
deported to Paraguay. Obviously, however, the defendant will rarely be so readily available.
48. This problem arose in Tel-Oren, in which there was doubt as to whether the PLO or Libya had been
properly served. 517 F. Supp. at 545 n.I. This defect, highlighted by the Solicitor General in his amicus brief
urging denial of certiorari, probably contributed to the Supreme Court's decision not to hear the case. See
Government Tel-Oren brief, supra note 43, 23 I.L.M. at 434 ("In these circumstances, we question whether
this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to construe a statute as complex and little understood
as the alien tort statute in a context in which the outcome of the case is unlikely to be affected.").
49. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Piper v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1982), the doctrine of forum
non conveniens has become increasingly important in all types of transnational lawsuits, particularly in those
involving transitory torts. See, e.g., Tompkins, The Doctrine ofForum Non Conveniens in the Litigation of
Foreign Aviation Tort Claims in the United States, 2 NOTRE DAME INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1984). In an order
upheld in large part on appeal, Judge Keenan recently invoked that doctrine to dismiss the suit brought in
the Southern District of New York against Union Carbide by the Government of India and Indian plaintiffs
injured in the Bhopal tragedy. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). See generally Weinberg, Insights
and Ironies: The American Bhopal Cases, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 307, 313-15 (1985).
50. This was the heart of the controversy in Tel-Oren. Judge Bork argued against assertion of subject
matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiffs had "failed to state a cause of action sufficient to support
jurisdiction under either of the statutes on which they rely." 726 F.2d at 799 (Bork, J., concurring); id. at
801 ("The question in this case is whether appellants have a cause of action in courts of the United States
for injuries they suffered in Israel."). For Article III reasons, the alien plaintiffs in Tel-Oren could not rely
solely upon state tort law to sue other aliens in United States federal court. See supra note 46. In Judge
Bork's view, no federal statute gave the plaintiffs a cause of action against the terrorists, 726 F.2d at 811,
and the treaties upon which plaintiffs relied had either never been ratified by the United States or, even if
ratified, were not self-executing. Id. at 808-10. Finally, he concluded that separation of powers concerns
counseled against federal courts' inferring private rights of action directly from emerging norms of
customary international law condemning terrorism. Id. at 801-08, 810-19. Judge Bork left open the
possibility, however, that these concerns would not "deprive an individual of a cause of action clearly given
by ... Congress." Id. at 804.
In response, Judge Edwards argued that the Alien Tort Statute provides both a right to sue and a forum.
Id. at 777, 780. Accordingly, in his view, plaintiffs need not look to the "law of nations" as a source of a
cause of action. Id. at 779.
51. For instance, many governments sue on behalf of their citizens as parens patriae, as India recently
chose to do in the Bhopal litigation? The similar question of whether the Republic of the Philippines has
standing as a "person" to sue ex-President Marcos under the RICO Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (a), is currently
pending in Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, Nos. 86-6091 & 86-6093, appeal pending, 9th Cir. 1986
(appeal from Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, No. 86-3859 MRP (GX) (C.D. Cal. 1986)) (ruling that a
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sponsored terrorism, how would prospective plaintiffs overcome any immunities the
defendants might possess against civil suit -diplomatic immunity in the case of foreign
individuals 52 or foreign sovereign immunity in the case of foreign governments?5 3
Seventh, would the United States court abstain from reviewing the subject matter of
the suit as nonjusticiable under the Act of State Doctrine, the political question
doctrine, or both?" Eighth, even assuming that any given suit could survive these
pretrial obstacles, how could a plaintiff obtain discovery of the evidence necessary to
prove causation of a terrorist attack?55 Finally, how could plaintiffs attach assets of
foreign government has standing).
52. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961,23 U.S.T. 3227, 3240--
41, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, grants diplomatic agents immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
most civil actions in the receiving state. A number of commentators, however, have recently called for
revision of this rule to divest terrorist diplomats of immunity. See, e.g., Note, Insuring Against Abuse of
Diplomatic Immunity, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1517, 1523-26 (1986) (describing recent incidents of abuse of
diplomatic immunity by terrorist-diplomats); Reston, Reflections on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1986, at
A27, col. 5.
53. In the United States, such immunity is, of course, conferred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976. 28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1602-1611 (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter FSIA]. Despite their many
disagreements in Tel-Oren, Judges Bork and Edwards did agree that the plaintiffs' suit against Libya was
barred by the FSIA's noncommercial tort exception, which permits a plaintiff to recover against a foreign
state only for noncommercial torts that cause injury, death, or property damage "occurring in the United
States." Id. §1605(a)(5). See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 775-76 n. 1 (Edwards, J.,
concurring); id. at 805 n.13 (Bork, J., concurring). A number of courts have recently held that FSIA provides
the exclusive basis for withdrawal of foreign sovereign immunity and have therefore dismissed Alien Tort
Statute suits against foreign governments on that ground. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), appeal pending (suit by Liberian corporations against
Argentina arising out of bombing oil tanker during Falklands war); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept.
1, 1983, 597 F. Supp. 613 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal pending; Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-
1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Mar. 7, 1985).
54. As interpreted by Justice Powell's concurrence in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), the
political question doctrine bars federal courts from hearing suits that "involve resolution of questions
committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate political branch of Government"; that "demand
that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise"; and in which "prudential considerations counsel
against judicial intervention." 444 U.S. at 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). In Tel-Oren, Judge Robb
concluded "that the political question doctrine controls. This case is nonjusticiable." 726 F.2d at 823 (Robb,
J., concurring). Judges Edwards and Bork each hotly disputed Judge Robb's claim. See id. at 796-98
(Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 803 n.8 (Bork, J., concurring). See generally Henkin, Is There a "Political
Question" Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (arguing against strict exemption from judicial review for
certain enumerated "political questions").
Similarly, the Act of State doctrine precludes the federal courts from inquiring into the validity of public
acts of recognized foreign sovereigns committed within their own territory. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964). That doctrine could theoretically bar examination of state-supported
terrorism occurring within a foreign nation's territory. Indeed, a number of recent Alien Tort Statute cases
brought by Filipinos charging ex-President Marcos with human rights violations have been dismissed on Act
of State grounds. See Trajano v. Marcos, Civ. No. 86-0207 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986); Hilao v. Marcos, Civ.
No. 86-390 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986); Sison v. Marcos, Civ. No. 86-0225 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986); Ortigas v.
Marcos, No. C 86-0975 SW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1987); Clemente v. Marcos, No. C 86-1449 SW (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 22, 1987).
55. Even if the Executive Branch should possess the hard evidence necessary to prove that a particular
terrorist or terrorist group was responsible for a particular attack, a federal court would not likely order the
Government to produce such evidence to a private party seeking compensation against the terrorists in a
civil suit. This would be particularly true if the release of that information might jeopardize national security
interests or disrupt planned counterterrorist measures. See Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ
for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports neither are nor ought to be published to
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states supporting terrorism before judgment and enforce any civil judgments ultimately
obtained, notwithstanding the restrictive attachment and enforcement provisions of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?56
It is no accident that these ten headings sound uncomfortably like a syllabus of
topics covered in a first-year Civil Procedure course. This enumeration of the legal
obstacles to civil relief against terrorists or states supporting terrorists serves primarily
to illustrate that such suits strain the capabilities of the civil adjudication system at each
and every step of the litigation process.57
Yet to dwell at length on any particular obstacle is probably misguided. A myopic
focus on the debate over availability and obstacles too quickly yields a simple, two-
part prescription: That courts should solve the problem of availability by construing
existing judicial remedies to reach terrorist acts, even when those remedies were
arguably never intended to reach those acts,58 and that judges should reduce the
obstacles to civil relief in terrorist cases by creating judicial exceptions to existing
obstacles to civil recovery whenever terrorist acts are alleged.
Unpopular defendants, however, often make bad law. An understandable desire
to make civil remedies more effective against terrorism may trigger unprincipled, ad
hoc judicial expansion of the available civil remedies and, ad hoc judicial elimination
the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps
nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in
order to be taken into executive confidences.").
56. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611 (declaring general rule of immunity of foreign state assets from
prejudgment attachment and postjudgment execution, subject o limited exceptions). The problem of
collecting a judgment against terrorists and states supporting terrorism has plagued victims and their
families. Following the 1976 car-bombing of former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier, for
example, his family recovered $5 million in a wrongful death action in a District of Columbia District Court.
See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980). When plaintiffs attempted to enforce that
judgment against Chile's wholly-owned state airline, however, the Second Circuit barred enforcement on
the ground that the airline, as a juridical entity distinct from Chile, could not be held accountable for the
parent's debt. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984). The court concluded that
"under the circumstances at issue in this case Congress did in fact create a right without a remedy." Id. at
798. Furthermore, the two most prominent Alien Tort Statute cases that have gone to judgment-Filartiga
and Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985)-resulted in default judgments that have yet
to be collected. See Comment, Alien Tort Claims in the 1980's: Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 12 BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 469,502-03 & n.167 (1986); supra note 40.
57. Indeed, based upon recent rulings, four of these obstacles to civil relief-subject matter jurisdiction,
stating a claim, justiciability, and enforcement of judgments-have grown increasingly prominent in
restricting the practical availability of civil judicial remedies to victims of terrorism. See supra notes 46, 50,
54 & 56.
58. It seems clear, for example, that none of the civil remedies described supra note 24 were originally
enacted with the intention of targeting groups supporting international terrorism. Now that Tel-Oren has
restricted the practical availability of relief under the Alien Tort Statute, victims of terrorism seem likely to
turn to other civil remedies. The use of those alternatives, however, also raises serious policy concerns.
Ironically, suggestions that Civil RICO be construed to combat terrorism arise amidst growing public
concern that civil litigants are abusing that Act's broad and vaguely worded provisions. See, e.g., Boucher,
Bill Curbing RICO'S Use Advances, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 15, 19, col. 4 (charging that "[tjhe
federalization of thousands of mere commercial disputes ... threatens to swamp a federal judiciary never
designed to handle such cases."). Similarly, the United States Government's use of "disguised extradition"
proceedings to expel suspected terrorists, see supra note 24, has stimulated serious protests from civil
libertarians claiming abuse of the deportation process. See, e.g., NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 3, col. 1
(describing objections to Justice Department claims that deportation of an Irish Republican Army member
to Ireland would be "prejudicial to the national interest," after the Department had failed to win defendant's
extradition to Great Britain).
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of particular litigation obstacles. Without a broader understanding of the policy
concerns implicated by civil suits against terrorists, such an outcome would ultimately
prove both unwise and uninformed. However important the debate over availability
and obstacles may be, it is not the only debate relevant to civil recovery against
terrorism.
III. THE SECOND DEBATE: OBJECTIVES AND
INSTITUTIONS
A. The Objectives of Civil Remedies
What larger objectives are served by recognizing and enforcing remedies against
terrorism? Whenever a victim of a terrorist attack obtains a civil judgment in a United
States court, that judgment promotes two distinct sets of objectives: The objectives of
traditional tort law and the objectives of public international law. A judgment
awarding compensatory and punitive damages to a victim of terrorism serves the twin
objectives of traditional tort law, compensation and deterrence. At the same time, the
judgment promotes the objectives of public international law by furthering the
development of an international rule of law condemning terrorism. By issuing an
opinion and judgment finding liability, the United States federal court adds its voice
to others in the international community collectively condemning terrorism as an
illegitimate means of promoting individual and sovereign ends.
At the same time as judicial remedies against terrorists promote these objectives,
however, they simultaneously raise two sets of serious concerns: Judicial competence
concerns and separation of powers concerns. The former address the possibility that
individual courts might lack the competence to conduct either the fact-finding or the
legal analysis necessary to decide particular civil suits against terrorists, as well as the
larger fear that the federal court system as a whole might be incapable of controlling
the potential docket-flooding posed by such cases. Separation of powers concerns
suggest that federal courts cannot adjudicate cases involving allegations of state-
sponsored terrorism, which have heavy foreign policy overtones, without exceeding
their constitutionally defined role or interfering with the foreign relations function of
the coordinate political branches.
While traditional tort law and public international law objectives generally cut in
favor of granting civil remedies against terrorism, judicial competence and separation
of powers concerns cut in exactly the opposite direction. Thus, the task of enforcing
civil remedies against terrorists is inherently double-edged. Just as judges enforcing
criminal remedies against terrorists must balance the desirability of swift and sure
punishment against the need to protect the rights of the accused, judges enforcing civil
remedies must balance traditional tort and public international law objectives against
bona fide concerns about judicial competence and separation of powers.
It is important to recognize that where one stands in the debate over objectives
and institutions ultimately determines where one sits in the debate over availability
and obstacles. Perhaps more than any other factor, this reality explains the deep
division among the judges who decided Tel-Oren. In that case, Judge Robb argued
that the court should dismiss the Israeli plaintiffs' suit against the PLO and Libya on
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political question grounds essentially because of judicial competence concerns.59 In
his concurring opinion, Judge Robb emphasized the inability of individual judges to
find the international law and determine the facts necessary to decide individual
terrorism cases, as well as the incompetence of the federal system as a whole to handle
such cases.60 Judge Bork's concurring opinion, on the other hand, relied almost
entirely on separation of powers concerns. In arguing against jurisdiction, Judge Bork
expressed his fear that judicial implication of private civil rights of action in terrorism
cases would inevitably create a clash between the judicial and political branches of
government, thereby violating the principle of separation of powers.61 Judge Edwards
offered two theories of the Alien Tort Statute which demonstrated a greater
willingness to apply civil remedies to promote the broader objectives of traditional tort
and public international law.62 In the end, however, his opinion also ultimately denied
59. See 726 F.2d at 823-27 (Robb, J., concurring). Although any judicial reliance on the political
question doctrine usually reflects a mix of separation of powers and judicial competence concerns, Judge
Robb's opinion focused on the "inherent inability of federal courts to deal with cases such as this one," id.
at 823, because "[tihe conduct of foreign affairs has never been accepted as a general area of judicial
competence." Id. at 825.
60. Judge Robb's opinion suggested that Tel-Oren "involve[d] standards that defy judicial application,"
id. at 823, and that such cases "are not susceptible to judicial handling." Id. at § 826. Thus, his central
concern was that "the pragmatic problems associated with proceedings to bring terrorists to the bar are
numerous and intractable." Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 801-08 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork identified three doctrines that might serve to
address these separation of powers concerns: The Act of State doctrine and the notion that such concerns
should act as "'special factors counselling hesitation"' militating against judicial implication of a cause of
action. Id. at 801-03 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 396 (1971)). Judge Bork chose to rely on the third doctrine, refusing to recognize any cause of
action not expressly granted to plaintiffs by the Constitution, a statute, a treaty, or the law of nations. 726
F.2d at 801-08. Outside the realm of self-executing treaties, Judge Bork conceded that the Alien Tort
Statute might support federal court jurisdiction in three types of cases: Those involving piracy, violations of
safe conducts, and attacks on ambassadors. Each of these, he argued, were violations of the law of nations
that were universally recognized when the First Judiciary Act of 1789 was first enacted. Id. at 813-14 ("One
might suppose that these were the kinds of offenses for which Congress wished to provide tort jurisdiction
for suits by aliens in order to avoid conflicts with other nations.").
62. Judge Edwards explicitly rejected the two limiting principles offered by his colleagues: Judge
Robb's political question approach, supra notes 54, 59-60, and the "no private right of action" approach
endorsed by both Judge Bork and the District Court, supra notes 41, 46, 50 & 61. In their stead, Judge
Edwards offered two alternative limiting principles: A "forum-shifting" approach, 726 F.2d at 780-88, and
an "international crimes" approach, id. at 777-80.
Under the forum-shifting approach, an alien plaintiff would derive his affirmative right to sue from state
tort law. If plaintiff could further allege that torts were "committed in violation of the law of nations," that
allegation would suffice to shift his tort suit (which would otherwise have to be heard in state court) into
federal court, where it would be tried under either state tort law or the law of the situs of the tort. Thus, this
approach would treat 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as providing a federal remedy for a right originally created by state
law.
Under the "international crimes approach," which Judge Edwards dubbed the "Filartiga formulation,"
726 F.2d at 781, the court would approach the statute much differently. It would read the words "tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations" in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 to encompass a few peculiarly heinous acts
(e.g., official torture, genocide, slave trade, and summary execution) that customary international law has
come to recognize as "international crimes." 726 F.2d at 781. Under the Alien Tort Statute, the federal
court would in effect be authorized to create a federal common law of torts compensating victims of those
international crimes. See infra note 64. Those crimes are so universally condemned that every nation is
deemed to have jurisdiction to prescribe domestic remedies against them. See REVISED RESTATEMENT,
supra note 12, § 404. Thus, unlike the forum-shifting approach, the "international crimes" approach would
view 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as a congressionally authorized domestic remedy for a right originally created by
international law.
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jurisdiction. Despite some claims to the contrary,63 none of the three Tel-Oren
opinions fully reflected the Second Circuit's view in Filartiga that, at least with respect
to established international crimes, federal courts should promote traditional tort and
public international law objectives: Namely, to compensate victims, deter
perpetrators, and enunciate norms of law condemning such violations!'4
I elaborate below why I believe that Tel-Oren was wrongly decided.65 For present
purposes, however, Tel-Oren teaches that federal judges will encounter severe
difficulties when attempting to cope with terrorism by construing statutes not
legislatively designed to deal with that problem. Certainly, dangers abound when
federal courts manifest their general opposition to terrorism by engaging in an
unprincipled, ad hoc expansion of civil remedies and loopholes to existing obstacles to
Both of Judge Edwards' approaches were more receptive to Alien Tort claims than were those of his
colleagues, insofar as both Edwards' approaches treated such claims as justiciable and neither required
plaintiffs to identify a private right of action expressly conferred upon them by treaties or the law of nations.
Id. at 788 (Edwards, J., concurring) ("under neither [approach] must plaintiffs identify and plead a right to
sue granted by the law of nations"). Nevertheless, Judge Edwards refused to find jurisdiction in Tel-Oren
under either of his approaches, reasoning that neither terrorism nor torture conducted by a nonstate actor
such as the PLO constituted "offenses against the law of nations" for purposes of the Statute. Id. at 788,
791-96; see also infra note 116.
63. See supra note 45. Judge Edwards, in particular, claimed to be "endorsing" Filartiga in his
"international crimes" approach. 726 F.2d at 777-82 (Edwards, J., concurring).
64. Although both of Judge Edwards' approaches to the Alien Tort Statute, described supra note 62,
would promote the compensatory objectives of traditional tort law, only an international crimes approach
fully promotes traditional tort law's deterrence objective, as well as the objectives of public international
law. Under the forum-shifting approach, an alien would assert an international law violation solely as a
jurisdictional device to shift a state tort case into federal court. Because state tort law or the law of the situs
would then determine liability and damages, however, the federal forum would award the plaintiff no
additional compensation for the international law violation and would not award punitive damages if the
governing law did not so authorize.
When Filartiga returned to the district court on remand, however, the district judge took a markedly
different approach. The judge first allowed plaintiffs a wrongful death recovery of compensatory damages,
costs, and fees in the amount of $385,364 based on Paraguayan law. See 577 F. Supp. at 864-65. Although
recognizing that Paraguayan law did not provide for recovery of punitive damages, the district judge then
awarded an additional $10 million in punitive damages relying on United States cases, as well as
international law. See id. at 864-67.
The Filartiga court's award suggests that a federal court applying an "international crimes" approach
would effectively treat the Alien Tort Statute as statutory authority to develop a specialized federal common
law of "torts only committed in violation of the law of nations." Such a federal common law would be similar
to that created by the federal courts in the area of collective bargaining contracts after Textile Workers
Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (reading the grant of federal jurisdiction in § 301(a)
of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, as authorizing federal courts to fashion a federal common law of
labor-management). Thus, unlike the forum-shifting approach, the international crimes approach would
authorize the federal court first, to declare that an international norm has been violated, and second, to
punish the perpetrator and compensate the victim directly for the international law violation. In this sense,
of the four approaches offered by the judges in Tel-Oren, the Filartiga, or international crimes, approach is
the judicial approach most fully sensitive to the full range of traditional tort law and public international law
concerns.
65. In Part IV, I argue that Judge Edwards missed an opportunity in Tel-Oren to use the Filartiga, or
international crimes, approach described in supra notes 62 & 64 to balance all four sets of competing policy
concerns. See infra note 114-125 and accompanying text. Although Tel-Oren may preclude the future use
of this approach in the District of Columbia Circuit, I see no reason why future litigants could not urge this
approach upon other federal courts, particularly those in the Second Circuit, which are already bound to
follow Filartiga.
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civil recovery. But in Tel-Oren, I would argue, Judges Robb and Bork erred too far in
the other direction. By adopting approaches that would practically eliminate access to
existing civil remedies, neither judge considered, much less accounted for, either the
public international law concerns or the traditional tort concerns central to any award
of civil remedies against terrorism.66 Tel-Oren demonstrates that one cannot resolve
the debate over availability and obstacles without striking a delicate balance among all
four competing policy objectives.67 This leads then to my next question, namely, which
national institution is best-suited to conduct this delicate balancing?
B. Which Institution Should Ideally Create Civil Remedies?
Which institution within the federal government can best balance the diverse
objectives and concerns outlined above? In reviewing the three broad types of
responses to terrorism, there seems little doubt that the Executive Branch, and not the
federal courts or Congress, is the institution within the national government best suited
to engage in direct action, or counterterrorism. Similarly, the courts, and not Congress
or the President, appear institutionally best equipped to enforce civil and criminal
remedies against terrorists, to the extent that such remedies already exist.
Which institution, however, should create these remedies, in the process
balancing the diverse policy objectives and concerns that determine whether victims
66. Under Judge Robb's political question approach, no court would ever award compensatory or
punitive damages against a terrorist or ever declare a norm condemning a terrorist act under the Alien Tort
Statute, because no court would ever reach the merits of such a civil claim. Under Judge Bork's "no private
right of action approach," a court could issue such a ruling, but only in those few cases in which plaintiffs
relied upon a self-executing treaty or based their claim on what Judge Bork treats as the three "recognized"
law of nations violations: Piracy, violations of safe conduct, or attacks on diplomats. See supra note 61.
Judge Bork's view that aliens may not sue under the Alien Tort Statute without a private right of action
expressly created by treaty or customary international law reflects two fundamental misconceptions about
modern public international law: First, that only states and not individuals may seek to enforce international
law norms and, second, that private remedies against international crimes exist only to the extent that
nations have chosen to create such remedies through positive international law. In the post-Nuremburg era,
it has become widely accepted that individuals, as well as states, have international human rights. See
generally REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, Part VII, Introductory Note; Sohn, The New International
Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982); Higgins,
Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in International Law, 24 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 11 (1978). Moreover,
in asserting rights recognized by customary international law, individuals are not necessarily limited solely
to the few remedies that nations are able to agree upon by treaty. Until recently, for example, the United
States had not ratified the Genocide Convention, a multilateral treaty applying only to states and providing
for only one effective remedy, namely, extradition. Under Judge Bork's analysis, an individual would have
no civil cause of action based on genocidal acts, even though customary international law has long
recognized both an individual human right to be free from genocide and the universal jurisdiction and
obligation of all nations to punish it. See generally REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 702 comment
d & Reporters' Note 3; id. § 404; id. § 907 comment a ("If a rule of customary international law has become
a part of United States law, a domestic remedy may be available for its enforcement.").
67. Indeed, the confusion among the opinions in Tel-Oren stirs uncomfortable memories of the
Supreme Court's post-Sabbatino rulings regarding the Act of State doctrine, see supra note 54, which have
regularly resulted in confusing fractured rulings and plurality opinions. See generally Bazyler, Abolishing
the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 330-44 (1986) (describing these cases); see also id. at 344
("The Justices cannot agree on the meaning of the doctrine, on the role the Executive should play in its
application by the courts, or on the status of the various exceptions to the doctrine."). This confusion, I
believe, reigns for much the same reason that confusion resulted in Tel-Oren, namely, because judges
deciding Act of State cases hold differing personal views of the weight to be given traditional tort law and
public international law objectives and competing judicial competence and separation of powers concerns.
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of terrorism should receive a civil judicial remedy? Both the language of the
Constitution and functional considerations point to Congress, and not the federal
courts, as the most appropriate institution.
Article I, section 8, clause 10 of the Constitution specifically authorizes Congress
to "define and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations." That little-discussed
provision may be read to confide in Congress the principal domestic responsibility for
creating remedies to enforce under enforced norms of international law.68 Congress
has invoked that provision on several occasions as a constitutional basis for enacting
civil and criminal statutes that have targeted problems related to terrorism.69 Pursuant
to this constitutional authority,70 Congress could pass comprehensive legislation (1)
defining the term "terrorism" (i.e., prescribing the scope of the legislation);7' (2)
clarifying the extent to which it believes that the federal courts should punish terrorism
through civil, rather than criminal, remedies; (3) striking the proper balance between
civil and criminal remedies; (4) defining the proper role of government and private
plaintiffs in enforcing those remedies; and (5) prescribing specific rules regarding some
of the specific jurisdictional and procedural obstacles to civil recovery described
above.72 Statutes as diverse as the civil rights laws,73 the federal antitrust laws,74 or the
federal RICO Statute75 might serve as models for this type of comprehensive
68. For various preliminary drafts of this provision, see 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 168, 182 (rev. ed. 1937).
69. The statutes enacted by Congress under its Art. I, § 8, cl. 10 authority include the FSIA, supra notes
53 & 56; various statutes criminalizing attacks on aircraft and internationally protected persons, see statutes
cited in supra notes 13-16 & 19; and the statute criminalizing piracy. 18 U.S.C. §1621 (1982).
70. Congress could supplement its power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations with
its authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; to "constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; and to prescribe the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, id. art. III, § 2.
71. The definition of international terrorism most frequently found in the United States Code derives
from the provision in the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1982). At
this writing, however, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State
Department all employ different definitions of terrorism. Compare UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1984 2 (1985) with R. CLINE & Y. ALEXANDER, TERRORISM:
THE SOVIET CONNECTION 109-10 (1984).
72. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text. As a model, Congress could use the FSIA, supra
notes 53 & 56, which provides comprehensive statutory rules governing subject matter and personal
jurisdiction, service of process, venue, immunities, and prejudgment attachment and postjudgment
enforcement in all suits against foreign sovereigns.
73. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(1982); Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242, 245 (1982); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
74. As currently comprised, the federal antitrust laws provide a complex scheme of private and public
enforcement. The Department of Justice may criminally prosecute violators of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982 & Supp. 1986). The Federal Trade Commission may, through administrative
proceedings, order parties to cease and desist from practices that violate the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1984), or § 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1973 & Supp. 1986). The Sherman and
Clayton Acts further authorize the Justice Department to bring civil actions to prevent and restrain antitrust
violations and to obtain injunctions and decrees ordering divestiture of assets. Other sections of the Clayton
Act authorize a private party who has been "injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws" to sue for treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees and to introduce a
relevant decree in a government-initiated action as prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation. See
Clayton Act §§ 4-5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 16 (1973 & Supp. 1986).
75. See supra note 24.
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legislation. Each of these bodies of law defines a new federal offense, articulates how
that offense should be punished by private and governmental plaintiffs through a
combination of civil and criminal remedies, and prescribes procedural rules for
obtaining those remedies.
Article I, section 8, clause 10 aside, there can be little doubt that, as a matter of
policy as well as law, Congress is also the institution within the federal government
functionally best equipped to balance the competing national policy objectives
described above. To inform its policy deliberations, Congress can hold hearings at
which human rights activists, victims of terrorism, representatives of foreign
governments, and officials of the Executive Branch could appear and testify. At those
hearings, all interested parties could engage in a wide-ranging debate, designed to
discern what specific civil remedies should be available to victims of terrorism and
what specific obstacles to civil recovery Congress should eliminate or reduce.
The last Congress witnessed the introduction of a spate of legislative proposals
designed to address various facets of the terrorism problem.76 Yet even a cursory
examination of those proposals reveals that the prevailing legislative approach to the
problem of terrorism has been piecemeal and noncomprehensive. Once we recognize
that a coordinated legal response to terrorism requires a unified package incorporating
all three of the responses described thus far- counterterrorist measures, criminal
remedies, and civil remedies-there seems little sense in developing such a plan in a
haphazard fashion. Thus, the ideal solution to the problem of civil remedies against
terrorism would be for Congress to address that problem within the framework of
omnibus antiterrorism legislation."
Practical politics, however, naturally dictate serious limitations upon obtaining
any form of omnibus legislation. For that reason, a second-best legislative alternative
would consist of developing a package of statutory civil remedy provisions that could
be attached to any of a number of bills pending before Congress. The two most
obvious vehicles for such legislation would be amendments to the Alien Tort Statute78
76. For a listing of just some of the bills proposed, see generally 20 INT'L LAW. 1083, 1086-87 (1986)
(listing fourteen terrorism bills considered by the 99th Congress).
77. My colleague Michael Reisman has also suggested a comprehensive legislative approach as the
preferred solution to the problem of civil remedies. See Reisman, Tel-Oren: Toward an Integrated Strategy
of National Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights, 1985 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 368.
In September 1986, President Reagan signed an antiterrorism bill that purported to be "omnibus" in
nature. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853
(1986). That Statute did take initial steps toward an integrated national position regarding direct action
against terrorists. Its key titles included provisions regarding diplomatic security, see id. tits. I-IV; rewards
for information relating to terrorism, see id. tit. V; actions to combat international nuclear terrorism, see id.
tit. VI; security of shipping and military bases, see id. tits. IX-XI; and calls for multilateral cooperation in
antiterrorist measures ranging from the use of diplomatic privileges and immunities for terrorism purposes,
see id. § 704, to criminal cooperation, see id. tit. XII. But as one key participant in the drafting of that
legislation conceded, "this particular piece of legislation . .. if nothing else is piecemeal." Panel on
"Terrorism: The Issue Confronting a Free Society," 1986 American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug.
11, 1986) (remarks of Joel Lisker, Chief Counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Security
and Terrorism) (copy on file with Texas International Law Journal). Indeed, the only title of that statute
that deals expressly with civil remedies, the grandly named Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, is in
fact quite modest in scope. See Note, supra note 69, at 387-89 (describing this legislation).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
680
TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,79 both of which have recently been
proposed for legislative revision.80
In sum, the second of the two ongoing debates over civil remedies seems far more
fundamental than the first. The debate over availability and obstacles is about where
we are now; the debate over objectives and institutions is about where we should be.
Furthermore, the first debate cannot be intelligently conducted without constant
reference to the second. One cannot meaningfully discuss which civil remedies against
terrorism should be available and which obstacles to civil recovery should be
eliminated without some consensus on what mix of policy objectives these civil
remedies should serve and what national institutions should most appropriately
provide them. To immerse ourselves only in the first debate ignores the fact that what
is really needed is legislative architecture, not judicial patchwork.
Ideally, Congress would address the problem of civil remedies against terrorism
as part of a comprehensive statute that targeted the entire terrorism problem through
a combination of criminal and nonjudicial civil remedies, in addition to judicial civil
remedies. Even without such a comprehensive approach, however, Congress could
openly balance tort and public international law objectives against judicial competence
and separation of powers concerns by considering and adopting a narrower bill that
solely addressed the issue of civil remedies.
IV. A SECOND-BEST SOLUTION TO THE SECOND DEBATE:
TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
Given that the optimal, legislative solution to the problem of civil remedies
against terrorism may not soon be forthcoming, it is important to consider whether
courts acting without further legislative guidance can provide a "second-best" judicial
solution to the second debate. Absent an explicit legislative balancing of the four
competing policy objectives described above, judges asked to construe xisting statutes
to provide civil remedies against terrorism have no choice but to conduct the balancing
themselves. But how can judges conduct that balancing in a principled, rather than ad
hoc, fashion, without giving overriding or undue weight to any one of the competing
policy objectives?
In my view, one cannot fully answer that question without reexamining the three
concurring opinions in Tel-Oren, and contemplating their broader social implications.
79. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611,1391(b), 1441(d) (1982) (discussed in supra notes 53 & 56).
80. The 99th Congress considered both the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1986, S. 2528,99th Cong.,
2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 7062 (1986) (a proposal put forward by human rights activists to amend the Alien
Tort Statute to create a private tort remedy for torture in violation of the law of nations), as well as a
comprehensive bill to amend the FSIA. See S. 1071,99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 3137, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1985) (companion House bill introduced by Congressman Glickman (July 31,1985)); H.R. 4592, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introduced by Congresswoman Mikulski). The proposed amendments to the FSIA
would, inter alia, modify some of the existing rules discussed above, including the Act of State doctrine,
supra note 54, prejudgment attachment and postjudgment execution of foreign sovereign assets, supra note
56. For commentary on these legislative proposals, see Feldman, Amending the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: The ABA Position, 20 INT'L LAw. 1289 (1986); Feldman, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of1976 in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L& COMP. L. Q. 302 (1986); Hoffman & Brackins, The
Elimination of Torture: International and Domestic Developments, 19 INT'L LAW. 1351, 1360-63 (1985)
(describing Torture Victims Protection Act of 1985).
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As I have already noted, the opinions in that case reflect considerable tension among
the participating judges regarding the weight to be given traditional tort law and public
international law objectives and to countervailing concerns about judicial competence
and separation of powers.8' Yet these same objectives and concerns invariably arise
whenever governments and private citizens sue one another in federal courts seeking
compensation for alleged violations of international law. When viewed in a broader
historical context, it becomes clear that the Tel-Oren plaintiffs' attempt to secure
judicial condemnation of PLO terrorism represented merely one example of a much
larger, ongoing phenomenon.
A. The Emerging Phenomenon f Transnational Public Law Litigation
The question of how federal judges may properly balance these competing policy
objectives and concerns did not originate with Tel-Oren. To the contrary, this question
has consistently plagued United States courts in the context of transnational
commercial litigation since 1964, when the Supreme Court decided Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino.82 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, far from
eliminating the balancing problem in transnational private law litigation, has only
multiplied its complexities.83 In recent years, federal judges have been called upon
increasingly to address this problem when confronted by the new, burgeoning type of
suit: What I call transnational public law litigation.84
81. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
82. 376 U.S. 396 (1964). Although the Supreme Court decided a number of significant Act of State
cases before 1964, in Sabbatino the Court recast the Act of State doctrine into its modem form. See supra
note 54. Declaring that the doctrine had "'constitutional underpinnings"' in the principle of separation of
powers, 376 U.S. at 423, the Court held that:
the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory
by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit,
in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law.
Id. at 428. In its current form, however, the doctrine is riddled with exceptions. See generally Bazyler, supra
note 67.
83. For a discussion of some of the numerous problems of statutory interpretation that have arisen
under the Act, see generally Feldman, Amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 80;
Feldman, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of1976 in Perspective, supra note 80. Many of the practical
problems that arise in transnational suits against terrorists first arose in the context of commercial litigation.
See von Mehren, Transnational Litigation in American Courts: An Overview of Problems and Issues, in
PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD - PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1984 (1985)
(discussing litigation issues highlighted in supra text accompanying notes 46-56 in the context of private
transnational lawsuits).
84. See Koh, Responsibility of the Importer State, in TRANSFER OF HAZARDOUS TECHNOLOGY: THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CHALLENGE (G. Handl & R. Lutz, eds. 1987) (forthcoming) (describing the
litigation following the Bhopal tragedy as an example of this phenomenon). The term "public law litigation"
was coined in Abram Chayes' article, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976). See also Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation And the
Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982). Not coincidentally, Professor Chayes i also the architect of one
of the prime recent examples of transnational public law litigation, Nicaragua's suit against the United States
in the International Court of Justice. See Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1445 (1985). The argument in this Part largely derives from a forthcoming article on the
relationship between transnational public law litigation and the Revised Restatement. That article will
sketch both the striking parallels as well as the clear distinctions that may be drawn between Professor
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Transnational public law litigation melds two modes of litigation traditionally
thought to be distinct. In traditional domestic litigation, private individuals bring
private claims against one another based on national laws before a competent domestic
judicial forum. They seek both enunciation of norms and damages relief in the form
of retrospective judgments.85 In traditional international litigation, state parties bring
public claims against other states based on treaty or customary international law
before international tribunals of limited competence. Although state litigants
ostensibly seek enunciation of public international norms by such tribunals, their
primary goal is usually prospective "relief" in the form of a negotiated political
settlement.86
In transnational public law litigation, these two modes of litigation merge.
Private individuals, government officials, and nations sue one another directly and are
sued directly in a variety of judicial fora, most prominently domestic courts. In these
fora, the actors invoke claims of right based not purely on private or public, domestic
or international law but rather on a composite body of "transnational" or "foreign
relations" law.87 Moreover, contrary to the classical "dualist" vision of international
jurisprudence, which views international law as binding only upon nations in their
relations with one another,88 individual plaintiffs engaged in this mode of litigation
usually claim that their personal rights arise directly from this body of transnational
law.
As in traditional domestic litigation, the announced focus of a transnational
public lawsuit is redress for individual victims, not states. As in traditional
international law litigation, however, the transnational public law plaintiff's underlying
aim in bringing the action is not so much retrospective as it is prospective. In
transnational public law litigation, plaintiffs invoke the court's jurisdiction not so much
to extract a binding monetary judgment as to provoke a political settlement in which
Chayes' model of domestic public law litigation and the emerging genre of transnational public law litigation.
See infra note 104.
85. For the classic statement of this model of adjudication, see Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353 (1978).
86. See generally M. KATZ, THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 145-61 (1968).
Perhaps the archetype of this form of international adjudication is litigation before the International Court
of Justice seeking an advisory opinion pursuant to art. 96 of the United Nations Charter. Such an opinion
does not purport to be a binding judgment; rather, it enunciates public international norms in a way that
gives some litigants a greater claim of right in subsequent settlement negotiations.
87. The Revised Restatement, supra note 12, may be thought of as the most complete compendium of
this hybrid body of private and public, domestic and international law.
88. International law scholars distinguish between "monism" -a school of international jurisprudence
that views international and domestic law as together constituting a unified legal system-and "dualism,"
the school that views international law as a discrete system of law for nations, operating "wholly on an inter-
nation plane." Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion
and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 864 (1987). See also Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of
International Law, 1936 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 66. Under a strictly dualist view of international law, individuals
injured by foreign states would have no right to pursue claims directly against those states. Their
governments would pursue those claims for them on a discretionary basis and would subsequently determine
the rights of those injured individuals to redress as a matter of domestic law. As noted above, however,
substantial inroads into this strictly dualist view of international law have been made in recent years,
particularly in the area of international human rights. See supra note 66. Viewed in this light, Filartiga
promoted a distinctly monist view of international law, while Judge Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren advocated
the dualist counterpoint. Compare supra note 64 with supra note 66.
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both governmental and nongovernmental entities will participate. Thus, although
plaintiffs may request retrospective damages or prospective injunctive relief, a
declaratory judgment or default judgment that announces the violation of a
transnational norm will serve their purpose. Regardless of whether the plaintiff may
directly enforce the judgment against the defendant in the rendering forum, the
judgment's value rests principally in its potential use as a judicially-created bargaining
chip in other political fora.
The numerous recent examples of this phenomenon may be divided into two
distinct categories: Those cases involving state plaintiffs and those involving individual
plaintiffs. The litigation brought by the Government of India against Union Carbide
in United States and Indian courts in the wake of the Bhopal tragedy provides perhaps
the most dramatic example of the first kind of case.89 Following an environmental
disaster, a state sued a private multinational entity in domestic courts, rather than
international courts, making complex claims based on transnational aw.90 India claims
to seek judicial reparations for its citizens' injuries, but its apparent motivation in
turning to domestic courts is not to obtain enforceable judicial relief, but rather to
obtain a judicial declaration of Union Carbide's liability for the disaster. India could
then employ such a declaration to provoke a political settlement that would bind
Union Carbide, India, the United States, as well as the private Indian plaintiffs.91
Similarly, Nicaragua's ongoing attempt to enforce its recent International Court
of Justice judgment92 against the United States in United States courts marks another
89. See generally Koh, supra note 84. The facts of the Bhopal tragedy are well-known. In December
1984, highly toxic methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide factory located in Bhopal, India, killing
more than 2,000 Indian citizens and injuring at least 200,000 others. Many of the victims lived in shanty
towns just outside the gates of the factory, which was owned and operated by Union Carbide India, Ltd., a
company incorporated and licensed under the laws of India and fifty-one percent owned by Union Carbide,
a United States multinational enterprise.
The Union of India and private plaintiffs filed suit against Union Carbide in American courts. In September
1986, after the United States suit was dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens, see supra note 49,
India and the State of Madhya Pradesh sued Union Carbide in a Bhopal district court; three months later,
Union Carbide countersued, charging both governments with contributory responsibility. For descriptions
of the legal issues raised by the tragedy, see generally Symposium, The Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEx. INT'L L. J.
267 (1985); Note, International Mass Tort Litigation: Forum Non Conveniens and the Adequate Alternative
Forum in Light of the Bhopal Disaster, 16 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 109 (1986).
90. In the United States, and now in India, the plaintiffs have offered a novel theory of "multinational
enterprise liability." They claim that, notwithstanding traditional notions of limited shareholder liability, a
parent multinational corporation controlling a majority interest in a foreign subsidiary that in turn runs a
hazardous local production facility has a nondelegable duty to ensure that the activity causes no harm. See
Union of India's Complaint, reprinted in MASS DISASTERS AND MULTINATIONAL LIABILITY: THE BHOPAL
CASE 1 (U. Baxi and T. Paul eds. 1986).
Plaintiffs have asserted this theory as a novel way to pierce the corporate veil under domestic law. See
Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 631 (1986) (discussing possible
domestic law theories of piercing the corporate veil in the Bhopal case). Arguably, however, such a theory
could derive support from emerging principles of public international law (e.g., international codes of
conduct directed at guiding the conduct of multinational enterprises). See Westbrook, Theories of Parent
Company Liability and the Prospects for International Settlement, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 326-27 (1985).
91. Most commentators anticipate that India will ultimately obtain redress not so much by winning a
binding monetary judgment as by provoking the negotiation of a complex international settlement in which
Union Carbide, India, and the United States will participate. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 90, at 330-31
(discussing the possibility of a diplomatic settlement); Magraw, The Bhopal Disaster: Structuring A Solution,
57 U. COLO. L. REV. 835, 844-47 (1986) (proposing such a settlement).
92. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)
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nation's parallel attempt to claim violations of transnational aw in domestic courts.93
Nicaragua, like India, sued with the announced aim of obtaining redress for its citizens.
Yet having already secured an international judicial declaration that the United States
has violated international norms, Nicaragua's domestic litigation appears prompted by
its desire to obtain a similar domestic judicial declaration, which it could then use to
provoke a political settlement with the United States in various political fora.94
The Bhopal and Nicaragua cases have migrated from traditional adjudication into
the realm of transnational public law litigation. But since Filartiga, the most intense
transnational public law litigation activity in the United States courts has arisen not
from suits by state plaintiffs, but rather from suits by alien plaintiffs against
governments and government officials under the Alien Tort Statute. This trend began
with Filartiga in 1980, when an alien obtained a federal court declaration that another
alien, a government official acting under color of state law, had violated plaintiffs'
internationally recognized human rights.95 Although to this author's knowledge no
Filartiga-type plaintiffs have actually received compensation for their injuries, some
have been satisfied simply with default judgments announcing that defendants have
transgressed universally recognized norms of international law.96  These small
successes encouraged other Alien Tort Statute plaintiffs to pursue a second class of
Merits, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (Judgment of June 27). For commentary on this judgment, see generally
Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (H. Maier ed.
1987).
93. Nicaragua's counsel will attempt to enforce the World Court's judgment directly in United States
courts. See N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1986, at 1, col. 2, continued at 4, col. 4; Effron, Nicaragua Likely to Press
on Ruling, NAT'L L.J., July 14, 1986, at 3, col. 1. In addition to Nicaragua's efforts to enforce the judgment,
a group of United States citizens living in Nicaragua, several United States organizations which send
travelers and aid to Nicaragua, and two world peace organizations have sued United States Government
officials in a federal district court. These groups charge that the Reagan Administration's noncompliance
with the World Court's judgment is "not in accordance with law for purposes of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706 (1982), and constitute[s] an unjustified exercise of state power in
violation of plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment due process rights to life, liberty and personal security."
Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, Civ. No. 86-2620 (D.D.C. 1986) (motion for
summary judgment filed Nov. 5, 1986).
94. See R. FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT xvi (1986) ("Nicaragua's recourse to the [World]
Court is at the very least a brilliant move in the struggle to convince world public opinion that they are
victims of illegal U.S. activities and that their approach is to seek peaceful settlements to the conflict.");
Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States and the World Court, supra note 84, at 1477 ("I think it is evident that
the actions of the [World] Court to date and the efforts of the [Reagan] Administration to escape
adjudication have already influenced the debate about whether and on what terms to continue financial
assistance to the contras."); Effron, supra note 93, at 12 (statement of Professor Michael J. Glennon) ("This
is a legal battle and a political battle, and a victory in one realm reinforces the battle in the other.").
95. See supra notes 39-40 & 64. For subsequent cases presenting this fact pattern, see, e.g., Ortigas v.
Marcos, No. C 86-0975 SW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1987); Sison v. Marcos, Civ. No. 86-0225 (D. Haw. July 18,
1986); Hilao v. Marcos, Civ. No. 86-390 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421
(C.D. Cal. 1985). See generally Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries Into
the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 5-6 nn. 17, 19 (1985) (collecting post-Filartiga Alien
Tort Statute cases).
96. See, e.g., cases cited in supra note 56. At this writing, the Filartiga family has still not collected the
default judgment in its case. The defendant, Pena-Irala, has not as yet been tried in Paraguay, to which e
was deported. See N.Y. TIME, Mar. 28, 1986, at A34 (Letter to the Editor from R.H. Hodges, Pelham, New
York).
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defendants: Not just foreign government officials, as in Filartiga, but foreign
governments as well, as in Tel-Oren.97
Most recently, aliens, frequently joined by United States citizens and
Congressmen, have begun to file such suits against yet a third class of defendants-the
United States Government and its executive officials.98 Plaintiffs in these suits seek
not just to obtain individual redress for past wrongs, but prospectively to curb
particular United States foreign policy programs-for example, the Reagan
Administration's support of the contras99 or its policy or detaining Cuban and Haitian
refugees'o-on the ground that those programs contravene treaties or customary
international law. As in Filartiga, the plaintiffs seek not so much to win judgments as
to reach the merits and provoke judicial declarations calling on American officials to
account for their activities under international law.'0 To the extent that plaintiffs may
97. See, e.g., Martin v. the Republic of South Africa Transvaal Dep't of Hosp. Services, 84 Civ. 9094
(CES) (S.D.N.Y filed Dec. 17, 1984) (suit by black American dancer denied emergency medical treatment
by two state-funded hospitals in South Africa) (decision pending); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (suit by Liberian corporations against Argentina
arising out of bombing of oil tanker during Falklands war); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 597 F. Supp.
613 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal pending (action arising from the deaths of passengers killed when Korean aircraft
was shot down by Soviet military aircraft); Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx)
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985) (action by Argentine citizens against Argentina for claims of torture; $2.6 million
default judgment originally rendered, but subsequently vacated after reconsideration on grounds of oreign
sovereign immunity).
98. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (suit by twelve Nicaraguans,
twelve Congressman, and two other Americans challenging U.S. policy in Nicaragua); Conyers v. Reagan,
765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinburger, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd,
745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), judgment vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 720
F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (suit by Congressmen challenging legality of United States military presence in
and military assistance to El Salvador); Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 755 F.2d 34
(2d Cir. 1985) (suit brought by association of British women, United States citizens living in England, and
two United States Congressmen challenging legality of United States deployment of cruise missiles in Great
Britain); Chaser Shipping Corp. v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (suit against United
States by foreign shipowner seeking $1.6 million in damages for striking a mine laid by United States in
Nicaraguan harbor).
99. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Ramirez de Arellano v.
Weinburger, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), judgment vacated,
471 U.S. 1113 (1985) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Foreign Assistance and Related Programs
Appropriations Act) (challenging occupation of plaintiffs' Honduran land for use as training facility).
100. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11" Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986); Jean
v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d
100 (4th Cir. 1982); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (excludable Cuban
refugee sought habeas corpus relief from federal detention); Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp.
1396 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541
F.Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
101.The question whether United States officials have a constitutional duty to obey international law
has recently generated substantial literature. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 88; Agora: May the President
Violate Customary International Law?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986); Kreisberg, Does the US. Government
Think That International Law is Important?, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 479 (1986); Lobel, Covert War and
Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035 (1986); Glennon,
Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive
Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 321 (1985); Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts
Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071 (1985); Henkin, International Law as
Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 321 (1985); Paust, Is the President Bound by the Supreme Law of
the Land? -Foreign Affairs and National Security Reexamined, 9 HASTINGS L.Q. 719 (1982).
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be said to have won such judicial declarations, they have sought to use them primarily
as political constraints upon the defendants' future conduct.102
Transnational public law litigation thus constitutes a novel and expanding effort
by both state and individual plaintiffs to fuse international legal rights with domestic
judicial remedies. Lawsuits which do not fit neatly into the confines of either
traditional international or traditional domestic litigation have migrated into this third
litigation realm. Moreover, the realm of transnational litigation, which itself
originated in the context of private commercial suits against foreign governments, has
now expanded to include public human rights suits against the United States, foreign
governments, and United States and foreign officials. The new breed of transnational
public law litigants seeks to couple an evolving substantive notion-the principle of
individual and state responsibility for violations of public international lawo03-with a
familiar process-domestic adjudication in a United States federal court.
Why this phenomenon has only recently arisen deserves far more extensive
treatment than can be offered here.104 Broadly speaking, however, there seems little
102. See, e.g., Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States and the World Court, supra note 84, at 1481 (arguing
that "in rendering judgment in the Nicaragua case, the [World] Court will ... exercise its function as a
spokesman for universal values" and act as "teacher to the citizenry"); Gerstel & Segall, Conference Report:
Human Rights in American Courts, 1 AM. U. INT'L L. & POL'Y 137,143 (1986) (quoting statement of human
rights lawyer) ("Where the President is aiding in the torture of others, we want the judiciary to be able to
come in against the President. The purpose of continuing lawsuits which may be frivolous, therefore, is to
attempt to bring the action into a legal context. It is necessary to create a means for dialogue even if you
know you are going to lose.").
103.In no small measure, this notion of individual and state responsibility owes its origin to the
Nuremburg trials. For recent discussion of the lessons of Nuremburg for the Nicaraguan World Court case,
see Kahn, From Nuremburg to the Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua v. United States and the
Development of International Law, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4-12 (1987). For a consideration of the broader
significance of those trials, see Cover, The Folktales ofJustice: Tales ofJurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REV. 179,
199 (1985). For broader analyses of the significance of recent developments in international law to the
relationship between the state and the individual and the decline of the "dualist view" of international law
discussed in supra note 88, see Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of
International Law, 35 CATH. U.L. REV. 929 (1986); Sohn, supra note 66; Higgins, supra note 66.
104.A brief outline, however, may lend some clarity to the picture painted above. In a forthcoming
article, I argue that the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Sabbatino, Filartiga, and Tel-Oren mark three
watersheds in the development of transnational public law litigation. Not coincidentally, Sabbatino and Tel-
Oren also coincide roughly with the appearance of the first Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (in 1965)
and the Revised Restatement) (which will appear in its final form in 1987).
In Sabbatino, the Court explicitly linked the Act of State Doctrine to the concept of separation of powers
for the first time, casting a profound chill upon the willingness of United States domestic courts to interpret
or articulate norms of public international law. Sabbatino was decided at a time when courts were beginning
to embrace "the passive virtues." See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40, 50 (1961). Understandably, federal courts read the Supreme Court's opinion
in Sabbatino together with notions of judicial deference to executive discretion in foreign affairs, see Chicago
& Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), and political question notions
imported from the domestic electoral context, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), as a general directive to
stay out of foreign affairs adjudication. This chill stimulated a period of judicial withdrawal from the arena
of international norm-enunciation that lasted for more than a decade.
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the domestic civil rights movement and the international human rights
movement coincided with the two other trends: A declining faith in the International Court of Justice as an
instrument of international dispute resolution and a growing willingness by domestic courts to subject the
commercial conduct of foreign sovereigns to legal scrutiny. At the domestic level, the federal courts directed
the rise of the "new" equal protection; the "due process revolution" triggered by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
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doubt that the decision of transnational plaintiffs to shift the locus of their litigation
activity from international to United States judicial fora was inspired by two
complementary trends: Growing acceptance by litigants of United States courts as
instruments of social change'05 and declining faith in international adjudication as a
meaningful process for enunciating international norms or curbing national
governmental misconduct.0 6 The former trend encouraged cases to migrate from
traditional domestic litigation into the transnational realm; the latter trend forced state
plaintiffs to file suits that otherwise would have been brought in international fora as
transnational cases. In the 1970s, domestic public law litigants first undertook Bivens
and Section 1983 litigation in federal courts to provoke the reform of state and federal
institutions through the enunciation of constitutional norms.107 Today, individual and
state litigants undertake transnational public law litigation primarily to achieve
clarification of rules of public international conduct and to provoke reform of national
U.S. 254 (1970); the growing accountability of government officers for officially inflicted injuries through
the decline of sovereign and official immunities; and the growth of the Bivens doctrine and Section 1983
litigation. See generally J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYsTEM 657-772 (1975). These trends fostered both greater public acceptance of the notion that federal
courts may-and indeed should-restructure wrongful systems, such as schools, prisons, and hospitals, and
increased confidence in the courts' ability and expertise to engage in such reform.
This growing faith in the capacity of the domestic courts to engage in domestic public law litigation
coincided with an explosion of transnational commercial litigation. As nations entered the marketplace and
the United States adopted the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity by statute, see Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, discussed in supra notes 53 & 56, federal courts became increasingly obliged to adjudicate
business actions brought by individuals and private entities against foreign governments. This plethora of
transnational suits not only returned domestic courts to the business of adjudicating international law (from
which they had excluded themselves since Sabbatino), but also stimulated a reawakening interest in the
black-letter doctrine of international and foreign relations law. That interest at least in part triggered the
legal community's call in the late 1970s for a Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.
The increased willingness of courts to adjudicate domestic public and transnational commercial law cases
in the 1970s, however, enhanced growing national frustration at the courts' apparent paralysis and
impotence in the public realm of foreign affairs, particularly with regard to adjudication of the
constitutionality and international legality of the Vietnam War. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1307 (2d Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit's 1980 decision in Filartiga, spurred in part by a government amicus
brief pressing the Carter Administration's human rights policy, finally signaled an invitation to private
litigants to venture into the field of transnational public law litigation. Although the Burger Court and the
Reagan foreign policy have since sought to dampen the zeal of transnational public law litigants, plaintiffs
have now turned precedents uch as Filartiga into vehicles to urge domestic courts to enunciate norms of
public international and foreign relations law that restrain the conduct of United States Executive Branch
officials in the world arena. The D.C. Circuit's ruling in Tel-Oren (particularly Judge Bork's opinion),
however, has now at least partially withdrawn Filartiga's invitation.
105.Two famous articles capture the social goals and functions of this changing conception of the role of
domestic courts. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, supra note 84; Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979).
106.See, e.g., R. FALK, supra note 94, at 1-24 (1986) (describing the decline in reliance upon international
adjudicative processes ince 1930); H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 240-43
(3d ed. 1985) (describing the "World Court Crisis" of the 1970s and 1980s).
107. See generally Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,
93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 HARv.
L. REv. 626 (1981); Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 784 (1978). In Bivens suits, federal courts have implied private rights of action for damages directly
from the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 278
(1979).
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governmental conduct.10o Just as Bivens provoked judicial creation of the United
States law of "constitutional torts,"109 Filartiga raised both expectations and fears that
the judicial creation of a parallel law of "international torts" might be forthcoming.110
B. The Opportunity Tel-Oren Missed
Set against his historical background, it becomes clear that the refusal of all three
judges in Tel-Oren to hear plaintiffs' claims on the merits has implications not only for
the current availability of civil remedies against terrorism, but also for the broader
question of whether transnational public law litigation in United States courts will
flourish or die out. All three opinions in Tel-Oren promote views that seem likely to
discourage the development of transnational public law litigation. Yet all three are
also fundamentally flawed. Upon closer examination, two of the opinions fail to offer
a principle for construing the Alien Tort Statute that would permit judges to balance
all four of the competing policy objectives outlined above. Both Judge Bork and Judge
Robb make the overbroad claim that transnational public law cases are, by their very
nature, not susceptible to domestic adjudication. Each judge succumbs to what could
be called "jurisdictional overkill caused by doctrinal oversight." Each judge
articulated a principal underlying concern-judicial competence in the case of Judge
Robb and separation of powers in the case of Judge Bork-and then answered that
concern by proposing a rigid, blanket approach to the Alien Tort Statute that would
108.Recently, transnational public law litigation has also become a type of "institutional reform"
litigation in the sense that litigants seek to use the courts not to reform prisons or school systems, but rather
to alter the manner in which the President and Congress carry out United States foreign policy. In both
cases, litigants have viewed the institution of domestic adjudication as a mechanism for encouraging social
change and inducing government compliance with legal norms. See, e.g., Chayes, Nicaragua, the United
States, and the World Court, supra note 84, at 1479-80 (comparing the World Court's Nicaragua decision
with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
109. See generally P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT (1983); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 69 (1980).
110. As Judge Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren implicitly recognized, Alien Tort Statute suits urge nothing
less than the creation by domestic courts of a system of public tort remedies to combat international crimes.
Such a system would be closely analogous to the system of public remedies developed by the federal courts
to combat constitutional wrongs in the context of Section 1983 and Bivens litigation. See 726 F.2d at 801
(Bork, J., concurring) (concluding that separation of powers concerns should operate in Tel-Oren as "special
factors counselling hesitation," quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, in the judicial implication of implied rights
of action). Some commentators also view the development of such a public international tort system with
alarm. See, e.g., Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the
Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467,474-78 (1986). In fact, however, such a system might be particularly
desirable in the international realm because of the pronounced diversity that exists with respect to degrees
of political development, national culture, and economic systems. In such a realm, the two principal
alternative systems of creating norms and influencing state behavior toward individuals-contract and
regulation-both tend toward impotence. International contracts often prove unacceptable means for
creating norms because of gross disparities in bargaining power. Coordinated international regulation often
proves inefficient or impossible because of conflicts in national regulatory philosophies, value systems, and
discrepancies in administrative structures. Thus, a system of transnational public law litigation, which places
special emphasis on the evolution of tort principles by domestic courts as a means of structuring national
incentives and creating international norms, may ultimately prove to be the most effective means of
promoting what I have called public international law objectives. Iam grateful to my colleague Peter Schuck
for this insight.
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not only inhibit its use against terrorism, but would also strip it of virtually all
contemporary validity."'
Both judges failed to recognize, however, that the severity of their primary
concerns will vary from case to case. Judge Robb failed to recognize that a federal
court's competence to decide a particular transnational' suit will turn critically upon
the particular facts and law relevant to the decision.112 Similarly, Judge Bork
overlooked the fact that the intensity of the separation of powers concerns in a public
transnational law case will also vary from case to case, depending upon whether the
defendants are aliens acting under color of state law, foreign governments, or the
United State Government or its officials. 13 By prescribing a blanket rule to govern all
111.Judge Robb's political question approach and Judge Bork's rigid "no private right of action"
approach both effectively reduce the Alien Tort Statute to a dead letter. It is difficult, however, to reconcile
Judge Robb's refusal to interpret the Statute with the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement hat "under
the Constitution one of the judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes and we cannot shirk this
responsibility [on political question grounds] merely because our decision may have significant political
overtones." Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society 106 S. Ct. 2860, 2866 (1986).
Similarly, although Judge Bork concluded that courts cannot exercise Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction
without invading the exclusive domain of the political branches, he implicitly conceded that some suits
brought under the Statute's "law of nations" language would not create separation of powers problems. See
supra note 61. If Judge Bork did not intend for even those cases to be heard, instead construing the Statute
to authorize the federal courts to hear only alien suits for torts in violation of self-executing treaties, then he
has all but read the words "in violation of the law of nations" out of the Statute. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982), federal courts may already exercise federal question jurisdiction over cases "arising under" self-
executing treaties of the United States. Thus, in the name of separation of powers, Judge Bork would have
rendered 28 U.S.C. § 1350 totally redundant. In my view, a judicial approach to a statute that effectively
reads it out of the books creates, rather than alleviates, separation of powers concerns. Cf Tel-Oren, 726
F.2d at 791 (Edwards, J., concurring) ("Vigorously waiving in one hand a separation of powers banner,
ironically, with the other [Judge Bork] rewrites Congress' words and renounces the task that Congress has
placed before him.").
112. Tel-Oren revealed that federal judges may alleviate concerns about judicial incompetence on a case-
by-case basis without giving 28 U.S.C. § 1350 an unduly constricted reading. Although Judge Robb argued
that federal judges could not determine the facts necessary to decide Tel-Oren, 726 F. 2d at 823 (Robb, J.,
concurring), he overlooked that all facts in that case were essentially uncontroverted. In Tel-Oren, the PLO
had publicly taken credit for the terrorist attack, and Libya had endorsed and ratified it. See id. at 799 (Bork,
J., concurring) (PLO "claimed responsibility" for the attack and Libya gave terrorists a "hero's welcome").
Moreover, although Judge Robb further argued that federal judges cannot handle the difficult questions of
international law necessary to decide cases like Tel-Oren, Judges Bork and Edwards effectively rebutted
that concern by engaging in extended subtle analyses of international law issues.
Nor was Judge Robb's political question approach justified by a broader fear that a finding of
justiciability in Tel-Oren would inundate the courts with Alien Tort Statute suits. As noted above, the
doctrines of personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and exhaustion of local remedies, combined with
practical limits on the availability of service of process, attachable assets, and discovery in Alien Tort cases
would screen out virtually all such suits before they reached the merits. See supra text accompanying notes
46-56. Only the rare meritorious case without fatal procedural infirmities, such as Filartiga, would go all the
way to judgment. Given that federal judges regularly apply these doctrines of civil procedure to ensure that
individual cases are justly and efficiently decided, it seems anomalous for courts to abstain from deciding all
Alien Tort cases on political question grounds, citing "pragmatic problems" and "judicial incompetence as
the rationale. See supra notes 59-60.
113. The separation of powers concerns implicated by a federal court's consideration of an Alien Tort
Statute case rise dramatically, depending upon whether the defendant is (1) an alien acting under color of
state law, (2) a foreign state or head of state, or (3) a United States official of the United States itself. As
one moves along this spectrum, however, the number of doctrines of federal jurisdiction available to address
these concerns on a discretionary, case-by-case basis also increases. For example, in a case such as Filartiga,
in which an alien sues another alien acting under color of state authority for an international crime, federal
court adjudication would not necessarily interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs by the Executive
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transnational public law cases, each judge overlooked the possibility that the federal
courts might be able to accommodate all four policy objectives underlying the civil
remedies debate by hearing some Alien Tort Statute cases, while selectively applying
existing doctrines of civil procedure and federal jurisdiction to target judicial
competence and separation of powers concerns as they legitimately arise.
In a different vein, Judge Edwards' concurring opinion in Tel-Oren did not so
much turn a deaf ear to transnational public law claims as it missed an opportunity to
clarify the international legal norms condemning torture and terrorism conducted
under color of state authority. In Filartiga, the.Second Circuit construed the Alien
Tort Statute as authorizing federal courts to hear claims by aliens that alien officials
acting under color of state authority had committed official torture, an act hat civilized
nations now recognize as a universal crime.114 Although adopting the Filartiga
approach in theory,115 Judge Edwards nevertheless denied jurisdiction in Tel-Oren,
relying on the curious reasoning that neither terrorism nor torture conducted by a
nonstate actor such as the PLO constituted offenses against the law of nations.116
Branch. By definition, an international crime is one condemned not only by the United States, but also by
the governments of all civilized nations, including the country in whose territory and by whose national the
crime was committed. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 605 (1980) ("The compatibility of international law
and Paraguayan law [condemning official torture] significantly reduces the likelihood that court
enforcement would cause undesirable international consequences and is therefore an additional reason to
permit private enforcement."). See also supra note 62. Thus federal courts may make rulings in such cases
without necessarily touching upon national nerves or embarrassing the Executive Branch in the conduct of
its political functions. Cf Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 ("the greater the degree of codification or consensus
concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render
decisions regarding it").
In the second class of cases, when an alien sues a foreign government or a foreign head of state directly
for an international crime, separation of powers concerns become more serious. In those cases, however,
federal courts may address these concerns by applying existing doctrines designed specifically to address
them. Where appropriate, courts may dismiss suits against heads of state on grounds of head of state or
diplomatic immunity. See generally Note, Resolving the Confusion over Head of State Immunity: The
Defined Right of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 170-71 (1986). See also supra note 52. Courts may dismiss
suits against foreign states on grounds of foreign sovereign immunity or the Act of State doctrine as those
principles appropriately apply. See supra notes 53-54, 56.
Finally, when an alien sues the United States Government and its officials for their alleged violations of
international law, Judge Bork's separation of powers concerns will be at their height. Yet here again,
however, courts may apply the law of domestic sovereign immunity and the Federal Tort Claims Act to
protect the United States on a case-by-case basis. The law of official immunities developed in the Bivens
and Section 1983 context will answer those concerns as they legitimately arise. See generally P. SCHUCK,
supra note 109 (describing these doctrines). Cf Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cit. 1985)
(applying these various doctrines to dismiss claims against various United States defendants). In short,
because federal courts have ample avenues available to them to target separation of powers concerns on a
case-by-case basis, no justification arises for dismissing suits that do not raise those concerns onjurisdictional
grounds, as Judge Bork would do.
114. See supra notes 40, 62, 113.
115. See supra notes 45, 62-63 and accompanying text.
116.See supra note 62. Judge Edwards found no universal consensus that terrorism constituted a
violation of the law of nations, 726 F.2d at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring), or that international aw imposes
obligations on nonstate actors, such as the PLO, when they commit torture. Id. at 791-95. Judge Edwards'
reasoning thus leaves a curious anomaly: After Tel-Oren, aliens may sue terrorists who torture them
overseas while acting under color of state authority by direct analogy to Filartiga, but may not sue foreign
states or nonstate actors such as Libya or the PLO for the same acts, so long as those acts are committed
overseas. See supra note 53 (barring suit against Libya because tort occurred overseas). Nor, according to
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In my view, all of the judges in Tel-Oren overlooked an approach that would have
allowed them to promote traditional tort law and public international law objectives,
without raising undue judicial competence and separation of powers concerns. That
approach, which provides a principle whereby judges could balance these four
competing policy objectives on a case-by-case basis, grows directly out of Filartiga.
Under this approach, a federal court would read the Alien Tort Statute to authorize
federal courts to incorporate into federal common law the notion that certain forms of
terrorism constitute international crimes.17  At least with respect to those
international crimes which are subject to universal jurisdiction,1 18 the Alien Tort
Statute arguably confers upon the federal courts authority to fashion a federal
common law of public tort remedies.119 Moreover, Sabbatino would provide judicial
precedent for the development of such a body of federal common law.120 Applying
Judge Edwards, may those plaintiffs sue even terrorists who act under color of state law for terrorism (as
opposed to torture), because there is no international consensus condemning terrorism.
In my view, Judge Edwards overlooked two key questions. First, even if the PLO is not itself a state, did
that organization in fact torture the Tel-Oren victims "under color of state authority" (as Pena tortured
Filartiga) by virtue of the Libyan government's alleged support for the terrorist attack? Second, even
assuming no international consensus condemning "terrorism," as that term is broadly defined, does an
international consensus nevertheless condemn an organized and deliberate attack upon innocent civilians
without a collateral military target, as occurred in Tel-Oren? Cf REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, §
404 comment a ("Universal jurisdiction is increasingly accepted for ... indiscriminate violent assaults on
people at large."). Had Judge Edwards applied the Filartiga "universal crimes" approach to these two
questions, see supra notes 62 & 64, he might have upheld Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction in Tel-Oren.
117. Cf supra note 116. This approach, which the district judge applied on remand in Filartiga, is the
approach most fully sensitive to both traditional tort law and public international law objectives. See supra
note 64. It would permit an alien to sue in federal court under the Alien Tort Statute only for those torts
that rise to the level of international crimes, as those crimes are defined by modern customary international
law. See infra note 118.
118.See, e.g., REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 404 (defining crimes subject to universal
jurisdiction as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps
certain acts of terrorism); see also id. § 702 (declaring that a state violates international law if, as a matter of
state policy it practices, encourages, or condones official genocide, slave trade, murder, torture, prolonged
arbitrary detention, or systematic racial discrimination).
119.With respect to the international crimes enumerated in supra note 118, the Alien Tort Statute
arguably confers upon the federal courts authority to fashion a federal common law of tort remedies for
international crimes. That body of common law would be analogous to the constitutional common law of
tort remedies for constitutional wrongs developed in the Bivens context. See Monaghan, The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term-Foreword Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1975). The federal courts'
authority to create such a narrow body of federal common law would derive directly from the jurisdictional
grant in the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Cf Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957) (reading jurisdictional provision of the Taft-Hartley act to authorize the federal courts
to create a federal common law of labor-management contracts). Alternatively, one might justify creation
of a federal common law of tort remedies for international crimes based on the theory of "protective
jurisdiction" urged by Professor Mishkin. See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" Jurisdiction in the District
Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 184-96 (1953) (reading a jurisdictional statute as a "law of the United
States" under which a case may arise for federal question jurisdiction purposes even in the absence of a
statutorily created cause of action, so long as Congress exercises ubstantial legislative power in the field).
See also Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
216, 224-25 (1948). As noted above, Congress has substantial egislative power to "define and punish
offenses against the law of nations." See supra text accompanying notes 68-80. In either event, 28 U.S.C. §
1350 would provide both a federal right and a remedy, thereby obviating Judge Bork's concern about the
absence of a federal cause of action. See supra notes 50, 61.
120. See supra notes 54, 82. In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court declared that, notwithstanding Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), "an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and
function of the Judiciary and the national Executive in ordering our relationship with other members of the
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this approach, federal courts could take jurisdiction over Alien Tort suits brought by
aliens against terrorists and their state supporters. If practical problems rendered
particular cases unsusceptible to judicial disposition, judges could apply civil
procedure doctrines to address these judicial competence concerns in a discretionary
manner.121 If the identity of the particular defendant made separation-of-powers
concerns peculiarly intense, judges could similarly apply doctrines of federal
jurisdiction to address those concerns on a on a case-by-case basis.'2 In short, had the
judges in Tel-Oren sensitively applied the Filartiga approach, together with existing
doctrines of civil procedure and federal jurisdiction, they could have paved the way for
at least a default judgment against terrorists-thereby promoting traditional tort and
public international law objectives-without raising undue judicial competence and
separation of powers concerns.'1' By refusing to apply such an approach in Tel-Oren,
the District of Columbia Circuit dampened hopes raised by Filartiga that transnational
public law litigation might provoke a broader integration of United States federal
common law and the emerging customary international law of international crimes.
Such a ruling would have served three salutary functions. First, it would have spurred
further dialogue among United States, foreign, and international courts regarding the
content of emerging international norms against terrorism.124 Second, it would have
international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law." 376 U.S. at 423-25. If
federal courts may fashion federal common law to articulate rules governing judicial abstention from
terrorist cases, there seems no reason why the judges in Tel-Oren could not have found similar judicial
authority to develop a specialized federal common law of "torts only committed in violation of the law of
nations" under the Alien Tort Statute.
121.See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
123. Under the approach urged in the text, the D.C. Circuit would still have directed the district court to
dismiss the Tel-Oren plaintiffs' suit against Libya on grounds of foreign sovereign immunity. See supra note
53. Moreover, if the PLO had been improperly served, the suit against that entity would also have been
dismissed on that ground, without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint after proper service or
attachment of PLO assets. But if service was proper, the District Court would have had jurisdiction to
proceed to the merits against the PLO. The District Court could then have held the PLO civilly liable based
upon its acts of official torture and indiscriminate terrorist attacks on innocent civilians. See supra note 116.
By defining those acts as international crimes subject to universal jurisdiction, the federal court could have
concluded that those acts gave rise to federal common law tort claims which conferred a compensatory and
punitive damages remedy on behalf of plaintiffs. See supra notes 64, 117-120. Even assuming that the PLO
did not appear to defend, and that plaintiffs were not actually able to collect on the default judgment, the
court would still have declared a norm of United States law condemning torture and terrorism, thereby
promoting public international law objectives. Moreover, the PLO would have been deterred in the future
from placing its financial assets in the United States. See generally D'Amato, Judge Bork's Concept of the
Law of Nations Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92,93-94 (1985). See also Panel on Civil Remedies
Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Terrorists, American Bar Association National Conference on
the Law in Relationship to Terrorism (June 6, 1986) (remarks of Steven Schneebaum) (copy on file with
Texas International Law Journal) ("Even if it's the case . . . that a lawsuit against a terrorist is ultimately not
effective to get real money damages for a plaintiff who has been injured, it may still result that after cases
like [Tel-Oren], it will be that much more difficult for terrorists to find safe haven in the United States to be
protected from their victims False.").
124. Had Tel-Oren fostered the development of a federal common law of tort remedies for international
crimes, that common law could not only have defined compensable offenses, see supra note 110, but also set
federal standards of civil liability, appropriate measures of punitive damages and standards of official
immunity. Cf Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1981) (setting a comparable judicial standard of official
immunity against constitutional tort claims). Moreover, by encouraging interaction between domestic and
international law through transnational public law litigation, such a decision would have furthered the trend
toward state responsibility for international crimes and movement toward a "monist" view of international
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better served public international law and traditional tort law objectives by
enunciating a domestic norm against international terrorism and increasing the
likelihood that victims of terrorism could secure compensation and deterrence through
civil remedies. Third, it would have expanded the federal courts' role in enforcing such
civil remedies, thereby making the federal courts a more significant player in the war
on terrorism.125
In sum, the judges in Tel-Oren missed an important opportunity to construe the
Alien Tort Statute to provide a civil remedy against a modem social problem,
terrorism. Even if the District of Columbia Circuit had not made the PLO "pay up,"
it could at least have promoted the ends of transnational public law litigation by
articulating and enunciating a transnational norm condemning international terrorism.
Taken together, the three opinions in Tel-Oren leave little room for victims of
terrorism to secure civil remedies in United States courts through transnational public
law litigation.126 Yet, as noted above, the equally ancient constitutional authority to
"define and punish offences against the law of nations" authorizes and indeed
challenges Congress to address the same problem through legislative enactment of
civil remedies.127 Whether Congress soon rises to that challenge and legislatively
modifies the ruling in Tel-Oren will determine the extent to which future victims can
turn to transnational public law litigation to combat terrorism.
law. See supra notes 88 & 103. By refusing to embark on such a judicial task, however, the Tel-Oren judges
have effectively thrown the task of creating such a comprehensive body of civil remedy law back to Congress.
But see supra note 65 (suggesting that litigants might still urge this approach upon courts that follow
Filartiga).
125. Such an expanded role for the federal courts in enforcing international law norms would reaffirm
the evolving international law rule that all individuals have fundamental human rights to be free from certain
state-sponsored conduct (e.g., genocide, torture, and certain forms of terrorism). See supra note 118. By
implication, such a ruling would also constitute a general judicial endorsement of the use of transnational
public law litigation to temper the actions of national decisionmakers. Indeed, one immediate and palpable
consequence of Tel-Oren has been a reduction in the exposure of United States Government officials to
Alien Tort Statute liability. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(dismissing Alien Tort suit brought against Reagan Administration officials based in part on the reasoning
of Tel-Oren).
126.See supra text accompanying notes 46-56. As noted above, however, litigants might still urge the
approach endorsed in supra text accompanying notes 117-23 upon courts that still follow Filartiga. See supra
notes 65, 124; see also Gerstel & Segall, supra note 102, at 158-59 (citing suggestion of conference participant
that "a tort suit brought against the PLO by the family of Leon Klinghoffer and aliens held hostage on board
the Achille Lauro would present a fact pattern similar to that considered in Tel-Oren. National outrage at
the brutal murder of an American in a wheelchair, however, might produce sufficient pressure to yield a
markedly different result.").
127.See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text. Indeed, perhaps the most favorable reading that one
can give to Judge Robb's opinion in Tel-Oren is as a judicial call for congressional reenactment of the Alien
Tort Statute in order to ensure that it continues to fit within our nation's current statutory topography. 726
F.2d at 827 (Robb, J., concurring) ("When a case presents broad and novel questions of this sort, courts
ought not to appeal for guidance to the Supreme Court, but should instead look to Congress and the
President."). As Dean Calabresi has suggested, when a judge is asked to construe a statute as obscure and
as ancient as the Alien Tort Statute, perhaps his most proper role would be to "ask, cajole, or force another
body (usually the legislature. . .) to define the new rule or reaffirm the old" in order to ensure that the Statute
enjoys contemporary legislative support. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
166 (1982).
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V. CONCLUSION
"Rights," one commentator has written, "preoccupy a Don Quixote; remedies
are the work of a Sancho Panza."'2 The District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Tel-
Oren both restricted the availability of civil recovery by victims against terrorists and
their state supporters and erected obstacles to such recovery. In the process, the three
opinions in that case dramatically limited the role of federal courts in combatting
terrorism through transnational public law litigation and retarded the development of
a transnational norm recognizing an individual human right to live free from terrorism.
Tel-Oren has forced both advocates and opponents of civil remedies against terrorism
to reconsider what broader objectives civil remedies should serve and which
institutions within the national government are best positioned to create and enforce
those objectives.
Tel-Oren was wrongly decided, and each of the judges failed properly to balance
the four competing policy objectives that underlie all civil litigation in this field. All
three judges missed the opportunity to apply a principled approach to Tel-Oren that
would have satisfied all four of those policy objectives. After Tel-Oren, Congress and
not the courts must now play the role of Sancho Panza with respect to civil remedies
against terrorism. Absent further legislative action, Tel-Oren will prevent
transnational public law litigation from playing a substantial role in encouraging the
development of domestic and international norms against terrorism. In the wake of
Tel-Oren, only renewed legislative attention by Congress-the institution
constitutionally and functionally best qualified to formulate national responses to
terrorism-can sustain the momentum of transnational public law litigation and
produce a balanced national statement about how we want to make terrorists both pay
and pay up.
128. P. SCHUCK, supra note 109, at 27.
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